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THE PERILS OF NATIONWIDE SERVICE OF PROCESS
IN A BANKRUPTCY CONTEXT
JEFFREY T. FERImELL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Shortly after arriving in his office in downtown San Diego Daryl Dobson
was served with a summons and a complaint. It directed him to answer a
lawsuit in United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Vermont.
Vermont? Daryl had never been to Vermont; he was not even certain
precisely where in New England it was located. Nor had he done any
business with anyone in Vermont, or anyone else outside the state of
California for that matter.
The plaintiff, SoCal Novelties, Inc., a California corporation, was one
of his local customers, but, as far as Daryl knew, it had nothing to do
with Vermont.
Daryl's inquiry revealed that SoCa Novelties, Inc. was a twenty percent
subsidiary of Vermont Novelties, Inc. which had filed a bankruptcy case at
its corporate headquarters in Vermont. SoCal Novelties had also filed for
bankruptcy reorganization in Vermont Bankruptcy court as part of the
reorganziation of Vermont Novelties Inc. and its various regional subsidi-
* Professor of Law, Capital Law School. B.S. 1975, Ohio State; J.D. 1978, Santa
Clara; LL.M. 1983, Illinois. I am grateful to Professors John Ayer and Doug Boshkoff for
their insightful comments to an earlier draft of this article; I am also grateful to my former
teacher and current colleage Stan Darling for the time he spent discussing various aspects of
the topic with me from a nonbankruptcy perspective. This article was supported by a stipend
from Capital University Law School. Thanks in this regard go to former Acting Dean Brian
Freeman and Dean Rodney K. Smith.
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aries. The suit brought against Daryl was one of many cases SoCal Novelties
had brought against some of its suppliers.
Daryl couldn't believe that he would have to respond to a lawsuit,
brought by a local company, involving a local transaction, in such a faraway
location. His lawyer, however, correctly advised Daryl that unless the
Vermont bankruptcy judge could be persuaded to transfer venue of the case
to a California bankruptcy court, a motion which in the interest of the
efficient reorganization of the debtor, is rarely granted, Daryl would have
to attempt to defend the lawsuit in Vermont. As Daryl was to learn, one
of the foremost procedural advantages of filing bankruptcy is the ability to
conduct any necessary litigation in a single forum before a judge familiar
with the debtor's business and financial affairs.'
Typically, the personal jursidiction of federal courts is tied to state
law,2 and thus to state boundaries.' However, the federal Bankruptcy Code4
1. With few exceptions, 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a) permits a proceeding arising under the
Bankruptcy Code or arising in or related to a bankruptcy case to be brought in the federal
judicial district in which the bankruptcy case itself is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (1988). See
infra text accompanying notes 41-48.
The drafters of the Bankruptcy Reform Act sought to abandon the complicated and
arcane jurisdictional distinctions under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 in favor of a simple
jurisdictional structure that would permit all bankruptcy litigation to be conducted in a single
bankruptcy forum. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 45-52 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONO. & ADuma. NEws 5963, 6006-6013; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 17, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONO. & ADIrN. NEws 5787, 5803.
For a description of jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 see infra note 219.
2. In most cases falling within the general federal question or diversity jurisdiction of
the federal district courts, the personal jurisdiction of the court depends on the jurisdictional
power of the courts of the state in which the federal district court is located. FED. R. Crv. P.
4(e)-(f).
3. Much of the scholarly debate about the nature and extent of the minimum contacts
doctrine in the law of personal jurisdiction since International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945), has focused on the ability of a state court to exercise jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant who has few, if any, contacts with the forum state.
Among the books and articles dealing with personal jurisdiction that contain material
directly relevant to the topic of this article are: R. CASAD, JuRIsDIcTioN IN CIviL ACTIONS
(1983); Whitten & Woods, Pennoyer's Demise, Personal Jurisdiction after Shaffer and Kulko
and a Modest Prediction Regarding World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 20 ARIZ. L.
Rlv. 861 (1978); Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction: A
Historical Interpretive Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses
(Pts. 1 & 2), 14 CREIGHTON L. REv. 499, 735 (1981); Developments in the Law-State-Court
Jurisdiction, 73 HLv. L. REv. 909 (1960); Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal
Jurisdiction, 68 IowA L. R-v. 1015 (1983); Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner: An End to Ambivalence
in Jurisdictional Theory? 26 KAN. L. Rv. 61 (1977); Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End
of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 33 (1978); Nordenberg, State Courts, Personal Jurisdiction and
the Evolutionary Process, 54 NOTRE DAZm LAW. 587 (1979); Redish, Due Process, Federalism,
and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1112 (1981); Hazard,
A General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CTr. REv. 241 (1965); Kurland, The
Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts-
From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 569 (1958); Rheinstein, The
Constitutional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. Cm. L. Rv. 775 (1955).
4. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
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and Rules s are not tethered to state law. The Bankruptcy Rules, like a
number of other federal statutes,6 purport to authorize service of process
5. FED. R. BAX.R. P. 1001.
For a brief history of the development of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure see
infra note 46.
6. Congress has permitted service of process in only a few situations. See 45 U.S.C. §
362 (1988) (Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act); 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (1988) (CERCLA); 33
U.S.C. § 921 (1988) (Longshoreman's Workers' Compensation Act); 29 U.S.C. § 1451(d)
(1988) (ERISA); 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (1988) (RICO); 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1988) (Sherman Act); 15
U.S.C. § 22 (1988) (Clayton Act); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1988) (Statutory Interpleader);
28 U.S.C. § 1655 (1988) (actions to assert property rights when defendant cannot be served
within forum state); 28 U.S.C. § 1692 (1988) (actions involving real estate located in more
than one judicial district); 28 U.S.C. § 1695 (1988) (shareholder derivative actions); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(e) (1988) (The Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962); 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1988) (Securities
Act of 1933); 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988) (Securities Act of 1934); 15 U.S.C. § 77vvv (1988)
(Trust Indenture Act of 1939); 15 U.S.C. § 79y (Public Utility Holding Act of 1939); 15
U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1988) (Investment Companies Act of 1940); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1988)
(Investment Advisors Act of 1940); 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1988) (Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act
of 1976); 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1988) (Federal Arbitration Act).
The scope of some of these statutory nationwide service of process provisions is further
limited by internal constraints on the application of many of them. See, e.g., Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. § 5 (1988) (stating that nationwide service of process provision applies only if court
finds 'that the ends of justice require that other parties should be brought before the court');
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (1988) (stating that
nationwide service of process provision applies only if 'the ends of justice require that other
parties residing in any other district be brought before the court'); Goldsmith & Rinne, Civil
RICO, Foreign Defendants and "ET", 73 MnN. L. Rav. 1023, 1053 n.101 (1989). Bankruptcy
Rule 7004(d) contains no such limitation. See generally Lieb, Jurisdiction and Venue in
Bankruptcy Litigation, 1982 ANN. Suv. BA-Y. L. 69, 85-89; Fullerton, Constitutional Limits
on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 79 Nw. U. L. RaY. 1 (1984);
Stephens, The Deferral Court Across the Street: Constitutional Limits on Federal Court
Assertions of Personal Jurisdiction, 18 U. RPcn. L. Rnv. 297 (1984); Abraham, Constitutional
Limitations Upon the Territorial Reach of Federal Process, 8 Vim.. L. Rnv. 520, 533-34 (1963);
Lusardi, Nationwide Service of Process: Due Process Limitations on the Power of the Sovereign,
33 ViL. L. Rnv. 1 (1988); Note, Fifth Amendment Due Process Limitations on Nationwide
Federal Jurisdiction, 61 B.U.L. Rav. 403 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Fifth Amendment Limita-
tions]; Note, Bankruptcy and the Limits of Federal Jurisdiction, 95 HARv. L. REv. 703 (1982);
Note, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in All Federal Question Cases: A New Rule 4, 64
N.Y.U. L. Ray. 1117 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction]; Note,
Pendent Personal Jurisdiction and Nationwide Service of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 113
(1989) [hereinafter Note, Pendent Personal Jurisdiction].
Furthermore, because the minimum contacts doctrine has been based since its inception
on now outmoded and anachronistic notions of territorial sovereignty, there has been little
scholarly or judicial doubt about the constitutional validity of the few nationwide service of
process statutes Congress has enacted. But see Fullerton, supra (contending that unrestricted
nationwide service of process statutes may be legitimately challenged on Fifth Amendment due
process grounds); Lusardi, supra (arguing that while Congress has authority to enact nationwide
service of process statutes, this authority should be limited by due process requirements). If a
court could constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction over anyone within the territorial
boundaries of the sovereign whose judicial power was exercised by that court, it seemed that
the personal jurisdiction of a federally constituted court could extend to the territorial
boundaries of the entire United States. See Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction, supra, at 1123
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anywhere in the United States.7 Further, section 1409 of the Federal Judicial
Code permits most litigation connected to a bankruptcy case to be conducted
in the forum in which the debtor's bankruptcy petition was filed,8 regardless
of the location of the defendant or the defendant's lack of contacts with
the debtor in the litigation forum. Moreover, section 1408 permits corporate
debtors to file a bankruptcy proceeding in any district in which an affiliated
entity has also filed.9 Daryl's dilemma is thus a particular problem in
bankruptcy reorganization cases involving geographically diverse conglom-
erate enterprises such as SoCal and Vermont Novelties. 10
There are, of course, important policy considerations in support of
these provisions. Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d), when combined with sections
1408 and 1409, permits a bankruptcy trustee" or debtor in posses-
n.30.
Finally, even where Congress has acted to permit a federal court to exercise nationwide
personal jurisdiction, venue restrictions limited the circumstances where an unwilling defendant
lacked substantial contacts with the state in which the court was situated. See 28 U.S.C. §
1391 (1988).
The general federal venue provision permits a diversity action to be brought in the federal
judicial district where all the plaintiffs or all the defendants reside, or in which the claim
arose. Id. § 1391(a). Other actions brought in federal court may be brought only in the district
in which all the defendants reside or in which the claim arose. Id. § 1391(b). Thus, diversity
actions can be venued in a district where the defendants have no contact only if all of the
plaintiffs all reside in that district. Otherwise the defendant will have contacts with the district
in which its case is properly venued because of the defendant's residence in the district or
because of the defendant's contacts in the district which gave rise to the cause of action.
Recently, the Judicial Conference's Standing. Committee on Rules and the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, which promulgate changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
under the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988), have proposed an amendment
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 that would permit nationwide service of process in all
federal question cases brought in federal district court. See Comn-rEE ON RULEs oF PRAcTIcE
AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT
OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, FEDERAL RULE OF CIvIL PROCEDURE 4(L), at 15-16 (Sept. 1989);
Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction, supra, at 1117-18.
7. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7004(d) provides: "The summons and com-
plaint and all other process except a subpoena may be served anywhere in the United States."
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1409 (1988).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (1988).
10. Cf. LoPucki & Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reor-
ganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 125 (1990) (reporting some
results of empirical study of reorganization of such enterprises).
11. A trustee is appointed in a Chapter 7 case "[p]rompty after the order for relief ......
11 U.S.C. § 701 (1988). In cases under Chapters 12 and 13 of the United States trustee is
permitted to appoint a standing trustee who will serve as the trustee in any case filed in the
district under Chapters 12 or 13. See 28 U.S.C. § 586(b) (1988); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1202 & 1302
(1988). In Chapter 11 cases a trustee is appointed only upon court order for cause shown. 11
U.S.C. § 1104 (1988).
Although a trustee's duties vary somewhat depending on the chapter under which the
case is proceeding, a trustee is normally required to perform a variety of functions related to
the collection of estate assets and the processing of claims against the estate. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 704, 1106, 1202(b) & 1302(b) (1988).
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sion12 to consolidate all of the debtor's assets, and all litigation concerning
those assets, in one place. 3
Furthermore, there is considerable authority, extending as far back as
Pennoyer v. Neff, 4 supporting the view that a court's power to assert
personal jurisdiction is limited only by the sovereign power of the state
whose court system is involved. Because Congress has, for the most part,
chosen to exercise only the sovereign power of the state in which the courts
sit, the salient sovereign unit is the government of the state. The jurisdic-
tional issue is whether the defendant is located in or has sufficient minimum
contacts with the state government to warrant that state court's exercise of
sovereign power over the defendant.
In federal bankruptcy court, however, Congress has not chosen to so
limit the power of federal courts. Instead, through the nationwide service
provision of Rule 7004(d), the salient sovereign entity is the United States
of America. 5 Thus, a defendant with minimum contacts with the United
States, or any part of it, can be made subject to the sovereign judicial
power of the United States. As will be seen, there is nearly overwhelming
authority for this position in the bankruptcy and other lower federal courts.
Lately, however, the Supreme Court has arguably backed away from
"territorial sovereignty" as the basis for its minimum contacts decisions
and has stated a separate limitation on personal jurisdiction. 16 This new
limitation has focused on fundamental fairness instead of territorial sover-
eignty.17 As will be discussed, the Court's most recent decisions are unclear
regarding the proper role of these conflicting doctrines. However, it is the
thesis of this article that protecting the defendant from the unanticipated
and unfair burden of litigating in a distant and unfamiliar forum is an
important constitutional limitation on personal jurisdiction that has serious
implications for nationwide service provisions like Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d).
The second part of this article will begin by describing the circumstances
in which the liberal venue rules in bankruptcy cases, combined with the
possibility of nationwide service of process, might result in a defendant
12. In a Chapter 11 case a trustee is appointed only "for cause, including fraud,
dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor by current
management . . ." or "if such appointment is in the interests of creditors .... " 11 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a) (1988). Otherwise, a debtor in possession of the estate has "all the rights, ....
powers .... functions and duties ... of a trustee .... "' 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1988). Normally
no trustee is appointed in a Chapter 11 case and the debtor remains in control of the estate
acting as debtor in possession pursuant to § 1107(a). 5 COLLIER oN BANRupTrcy 1104.01[7][b]
(L. King 15th ed. 1990).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 215-43.
14. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
15. See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
16. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694
(1982).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 94-112.
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being called upon to answer in a forum with which the defendant has no
discernable contact. The first part of Section III will analyze recent decisions
by the Supreme Court, particularly Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinee8 and Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz 9 in which
state sovereignty, as the basis of the minimum contacts doctrine, has been
questioned and arguably supplanted. This analysis will provide the foun-
dation for a constitutionally based argument that some version of the
minimum contacts doctrine must serve as a limitation on the existing
nationwide service of process rule applicable in bankruptcy cases.
The second half of Section III will describe how modern courts have
responded to the argument that nationwide service of process is limited by
the fairness concern of the Fifth Amendment. Section IV explains how the
values and policies associated with Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d) might be
reconciled with the Fifth Amendment's restrictions on nationwide service of
process. Section IV will conclude by proposing that state boundaries, within
the United States, should be used to establish presumptive limitations on a
federal court's personal jurisdictional authority in bankruptcy cases. 20
II. MODERN CoRPORAT STRUCTURE, PERSONAL JURIsDICTION, AND
VENUE IN BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION
In the last few years there has been an explosion of bankruptcy filings
by large, publicly held, conglomerate corporate debtors. 2' When such com-
panies file a bankruptcy case they not infrequently cause petitions to be
filed on behalf of their subsidiaries.? Such large, and even smaller bank-
ruptcy cases spawn a considerable amount of related litigation between the
principal debtor or its subsidiaries and those who have dealt with the various
corporate debtors in such cases.
18. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
19. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
20. The model suggested by this article is consistent with, although not identical to the
"Mutual Inconvenience Paradigm" of personal jurisdiction described in Kogan, A Neo-
Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 257 (1990). Under this paradigm
the issue of personal jurisdiction is primarily one of the administration of justice and cost-
effective adjudication. Id. at 368. The difference between the model of analysis suggested here
and the Mutual Inconvenience Paradigm explained by Prof. Kogan is that in this model the
plaintiff's interests are explained in terms of the federal government's interest in achieving a
cost efficient administration of bankruptcy estate assets. See infra text accompanying notes
215-43. Further, where a party has minimum contacts with any part of the United States there
is no possibility of a problem with the territorial sovereignty of a federal court over that party.
See infra text accompanying note 301.
21. See generally LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 10, at 134.
22. See Lopucki & Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 Wis. L. Rnv. 11, 21. On Jan. 15,
1990 Campeau Inc. caused voluntary petitions to be filed for Federated Department Stores,
Inc., Allied Stores Corp., and approximately 64 affiliated companies. See, e.g., In re Federated
Department Stores, Inc., No. 1-90-00130 (S.D. Ohio, Jan. 15, 1990) (voluntary petition); In
re Allied Stores,Corp., No. 1-90-00131 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio, Jan. 15, 1990) (voluntary petition);
petitions in 64 separate but affiliated cases on file at Capital University Law School.
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A. Personal Jurisdiction and Service of Process in Bankruptcy Litigation
Rule 7004(d) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure provides
for the service of "the summons and complaint [in an adversary proceeding]
... anywhere in the United States."' Rule 7004(d), however, like Rule 4(e)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, governs only the actual service of
process, not the defendant's amenability to that process under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 24
Most cases considering the impact of the Fifth Amendment on federal
nationwide service of process rules like Rule 7004(d) have concluded that
the Fifth Amendment is satisfied as long as the defendant has minimum
contacts with the United States or any part of it.25
While this result may be acceptable in other situations where Congress
has provided for nationwide service of process, the peculiarities of bank-
ruptcy litigation make this result potentially unfair. This is particularly true
in a bankruptcy reorganization case involving a corporate debtor whose
geographically distant subsidiaries may have been permitted to file for
protection under the bankruptcy laws in the same venue as their parent
despite the subsidiary's lack of other connections with the forum state. A
brief explanation of the jurisdiction and venue rules governing bankruptcy
cases and adversary bankruptcy litigation will be helpful in understanding
the problem that nationwide service of process can create in such a context.
B. Venue of Bankruptcy Cases
A bankruptcy case for a corporation may be filed in the federal judicial
district in which a corporation's domicile, principal place of business, or
principal United States assets have been located for the one hundred and
eighty days immediately preceding the date of the bankruptcy petition.2
6
Alternatively, a corporation may begin a bankruptcy case in a jurisdiction
in which a case concerning the corporation's "affiliate" is already pending.27
An "affiliate" includes a person who owns or controls voting power
over twenty percent of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor in
question.? The term also includes a corporation, twenty percent or more
of the outstanding voting stock of which is owned or controlled by a person,
including a corporation, who is already a debtor in a bankruptcy case.
29
23. FED. R. B ia. P. 7004(d).
24. See FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1312 n.61
(D.C. Cir. 1980).
25. E.g., Continental Air Lines v. Hillblom (In re Continental Airlines), 61 Bankr. 758
(S.D. Tex. 1986). See infra text accompanying notes 157-73.
The defendant must also, of course, be given notice of the proceeding and have the
opportunity to respond. See, e.g., In re First Hartford Corp., 63 Bankr. 479 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1986); see generally Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1408(1) (1988).
27. Id. § 1408(2).
28. 11 U.S.C. § 101(2)(A) (1988).
29. Id. § 101(2)(B).
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The practical impact of these rules is that a corporation can file a
bankruptcy petition in any district in which its parent or one of its
subsidiaries has filedA0 For example, an Ohio corporation, with its principal
place of business in Ohio, all of whose assets are located in Ohio, might
file a Chapter 11 reorganization petition in the Southern District of Cali-
fornia if an owner of twenty percent of its stock is already a debtor in a
bankruptcy case venued in that distant district. The Ohio corporation might
similarly commence its reorganization case in the District of Alaska if it
has an Alaska subsidiary already in bankruptcy court there. These are, of
course, extreme examples, but ones not unheard of in reported cases3' or
among members of the bankruptcy bar.
32
C. Venue of Proceedings on Creditors' Claims
Among the most important types of proceedings in a bankruptcy case
are proceedings to determine the allowability of claims. A claim is a "right
to payment ... or to an equitable remedy . . . . 33 A creditor's claim, once
filed, 34 is "deemed allowed, unless a party in interest ... objects." 35 If
such a party objects to a claim, the court must determine the allowability
and amount of the claim. 3
6
A proceeding to determine the allowability of a claim is a core pro-
ceeding that may be heard and finally determined by a bankruptcy judge37
as a contested matter3 in the bankruptcy court in which the bankruptcy
case is pending. 39 Service of notice of a motion to disallow a claim is made
pursuant to Rule 700440 thus making it clear that the nationwide service of
process provision of Rule 7004(d) applies in a proceeding to determine a
claim.
30. 1 CoLuR oN BAN 'RupTcY, supra note 12, 3.02[l] [d].
31. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 102 Bankr. 335 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Johns-
Manville Corp., 97 Bankr. 174 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989); In re Ocean Properties of Delaware,
Inc., 95 Bankr. 304 (Bankr. D. Del. 1988); In re Pope Vineyards, 90 Bankr. 252 (Bankr. S.D.
Texas 1988); In re Oceanguest Feeder Service, Inc., 56 Bankr. 715 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1986).
32. See, e.g., Care Enterprise, Inc. v. Hazelbaker (In re Care Enterprises, Inc.), No. LA
88-01918 (AG) (Order Denying Motions to Dismiss and for Change of Venue) (copy on file
with Author).
33. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1988).
34. Section 501 of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the filing of claims. 11 U.S.C. §
501 (1988). See also FED. R. B, -R. P. 3001-3005.
35. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1988).
36. Id. § 502(b). Claims can be disallowed or limited in amount for a variety of reasons
not relevant to the topic of this paper. However, any claim unenforceable against the debtor
and the debtor's property will be disallowed. Id. § 502(b)(1).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), (b)(2)(B) (1988).
38. See FED. R. BAmca. P. 9014. If the trustee or debtor in possession wishes to bring
a counterclaim against the claiming creditor, the proceeding to determine both the claim and
counterclaim will be treated as an adversary proceeding. FED. R. Civ. P. 7001; see Advisory
Committee Note to FED. R. BANR. P. 3007.
39. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 9002(4).
40. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014.
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D. Venue of Adversary Litigation in Connection with a Bankruptcy Case
Adversary proceedings are disputes arising in the course of a bankruptcy
case that may be brought to the court's attention only by filing a complaint. 4
With few exceptions42 adversary litigation connected to a bankruptcy case
can be brought in the district in which the underlying bankruptcy case is
pending.
43
41. See FaD. R. BNuR. P. 7003 & FED. R. Civ. P. 3. Such proceedings are limited to
proceedings:
(1) to recover money or property, except a proceeding to compel the debtor to
deliver property to the trustee, or a proceeding under § 554(b) or § 725 of the Code,
Rule 2017, or Rule 6002; (2) to determine the validity, priority, or extent of a lien
or other interest in property, other than a proceeding under Rule 4003(d); (3) to
obtain approval pursuant to § 363(h) for the sale of both the interest of the estate
and of a co-owner in property; (4) to object to or revoke a discharge; (5) to revoke
an order of confirmation of a chapter 11 or chapter 13 plan; (6) to determine the
dischargeability of a debt; (7) to obtain an injunction or other equitable relief; (8)
to subordinate any allowed claim or interest, except when subordination is provided
in a chapter 9, 11, or 13 plan; (9) to obtain a declaratory judgment relating to any
of the foregoing; or (10) to determine a claim or cause of action removed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1452.
FED. R. BAutR. P. 7001.
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1409(b), (e) (1988); see 1 Cou.-Ti oN BANKauvrcY, supra note 12,
3.02[2][b]- [e].
Actions brought by the trustee or debtor in possession, not arising under the Bankruptcy
Code, to collect a money judgment of or property worth less than $1,000 or a consumer debt
of less than $5,000 may be brought only in the district in which the defendant resides. 28
U.S.C. § 1409(b) (1988). This provision recognizes that there are cases in which the burden
on the defendant of having to defend in the forum of the debtor's choice may be highly
inconvenient and may result in the defendant suffering a default judgment rather than investing
greater resources to resist liability. See Whelan, Practice Under the 1984 Bankruptcy Amend-
ments, 55 PA. B.A.Q. 206 (1984).
Further, three types of actions may be commenced in the district in which the action
might have been brought under the otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy venue provision. These
include actions brought by the trustee based on a claim arising after the commencement of
the underlying bankruptcy case, actions brought by the trustee or under sections 541 or 544(b)
of the Bankruptcy Code, and actions brought against the estate, arising from the post-petition
business activities of the debtor. 28 U.S.C. § 1409(c), (e) (1988).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a) (1988); see FED. R. BANxR. P. 5005(a).
Section 1409 is not expressly exclusive. See 1 CoiumR oN BcRup-rcy, supra note 12,
3.02[2][a]. As a result, civil disputes have been filed by parties other than the debtor in districts
different from, and in some cases, far away from the district in which the bankruptcy case is
pending. Gibson, Home Court, Outpost Court: Reconciling Bankruptcy Case Control with
Venue Flexibility in Proceedings, 62 Am. BAK. L.J. 37 (1988). Debtors and Trustees, of
course, have resisted litigating in so-called "outpost" courts, see Gibson, supra, at 40-47, and
many courts have ruled that such proceedings cannot be maintained anywhere other than the
home court in which the bankruptcy case itself is pending. See, e.g., Brown v. Republic Oil
Corp. (In re Republic Oil Corp.), 59 Bankr. 884, 886 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1986) (holding that
outpost court suits violate automatic stay); In re Fields, 55 Bankr. 294 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1985)
(stating that Bankruptcy Rule 5005 requires proceedings to be brought in home court); Hamilton
v. Dahlquist (In re Dahlquist), 53 Bankr. 428, 429 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1985) (ruling that home
court has exclusive jurisdiction over debtor's property); Wes-Flo Inc. v. Wilson Freight Co.
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The change of venue rule applicable to bankruptcy litigation is articu-
lated in familiar language, emphasizing the interest of justice and the
convenience of the parties," but motions for change of venue in civil
proceedings in a bankruptcy case are rarely granted. Bankruptcy judges
highly value the administrative convenience and ability to preserve the
debtor's assets that is achieved by keeping every aspect of the bankruptcy
case in the same forum. 5 This rule, when combined with the venue provision
for bankruptcy cases themselves and the nationwide service of process rule
in bankruptcy litigation provides a potent weapon for conglomerate business
entities involved in reorganization proceedings.
The operation of these rules would, for example, permit the hypothetical
Ohio corporation, discussed above, to bring suits against its customers,
suppliers, and creditors in federal bankruptcy court in San Diego, where its
bankruptcy case was pending. At best, these rules facilitate the prompt and
efficient administration of a corporate debtor's reorganization case." In
(In re Wilson Freight Co.), 13 Bankr. 617, 620 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984); Littleton Nat'l Bank
v. Coleman American Co. (In re Coleman American Co.), 6 Bankr. 251 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1980), required to be dismissed in Coleman American Co. v. Littleton Nat'l Bank (In re
Coleman American Co.), 8 Bankr. 384 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981). Most courts have ruled that
the outpost court has jurisdiction, but lacks venue. See Gibson, supra, at 42-43. Still other
courts have attempted to draw a distinction between administrative matters and civil proceed-
ings, I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 12, 3.02[2][a], at 3-125, and permit outpost
courts to handle the latter, but not the former. See Gibson, supra, at 44-45. Although not yet
satisfactorily resolved, this problem does not raise questions about the propriety of nationwide
service, because actions in outpost courts usually have been brought by the geographically
distant party who has conducted business with the debtor in the outpost forum. See Coleman
Am. Co. v. Littleton Nat'l Bank (In re Coleman Am. Co.), 8 Bankr. 384 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1981) (involving creditor who held lien on property located in other state).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1412 (1988).
45. See Gulf States Exploration Co. v. Manville Forest Prods. Corp. (In re Manville
Forest Prod. Corp.), 898 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1990); Glassel v. Allegheny Int'l Credit Corp.
(In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc.), III Bankr. 495 (W.D. Pa. 1990); GEX, Inc. v. Wolf Creek
Collieries Co. (In re GEX Kentucky, Inc.), 85 Bankr. 431 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); Wyandotte
Indus. v. E.Y. Neill & Co. (In re First Hartford Corp.), 63 Bankr. 479 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1986); Frazier v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. (In re Butcher), 46 Bankr. 109 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1985); Windsor Communications Group, Inc. v. Five Towns Stationery (In re Windsor
Communications Group, Inc.), 53 Bankr. 293 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985); Nixon Mach. Co. v.
Roy Energy, Inc. (In re Nixon Machinery Co.), 27 Bankr. 871 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983); In
re Med Gen., Inc., 17 Bankr. 13 (Bankr. Minn. 1981); Gibson, supra note 43, at 37-38.
46. The need for improving the efficiency of estate administration was first noted by
the now infamous Brookings Institution study, D. STANLEY & M. GuITH, BANKRUPTCY:
PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM (1971).
Prior to the adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules, bankruptcy procedure was governed by
a variety of General Orders, local bankruptcy rules, and unwritten procedures. Landers, The
New Bankruptcy Rules: Relics of the Past as Fixtures of the Future, 57 MINN. L. REV. 827,
828 (1973). In 1959 the Advisory Committee of Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference appointed
an Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules to revise the Supreme Court's General Orders
in Bankruptcy and the Official Bankruptcy Forms. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON BANKRUPTCY
RULES, PRELIMINARY DRAFr OF FED. R. BANKR. P. introductory note (1971) [hereinafter
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES]; Landers, supra, at 829. Following these revisions the Advisory
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some cases, however, the rules may force an unwilling defendant to partic-
ipate in litigation located in an inconvenient judicial forum with which the
defendant has had not even minimal contact. 47 There is, as well, an as yet
Committee promulgated a comprehensive set of bankruptcy rules which the Supreme Court
adopted in 1973 pursuant to its authority under the existing version of 28 U.S.C. § 2075
(1970). Under that version of § 2075, the Court had authority to adopt Bankruptcy Rules
which would supersede provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. See Landers, supra, at 829, 834-35.
See ADVISORY CoITnE NoTs, supra. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-598, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmiN. NEws (92 Stat.) 2549, amended § 2075 to require
the Bankruptcy Rules to be consistent with the provisions of the new Bankruptcy Code. See
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598 § 405(d), 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADmnu. NEws (92 Stat.) 2549, 2685. The Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules was
reconstituted in response to the adoption of the Bankruptcy Reform Act and the Committee
promulgated a new set of bankruptcy rules which were adopted in 1983. Although the 1983
rules were drafted in the anticipation that they would be consistent with the Supreme Court's
decision in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982),
those hopes were dashed by the substantive provisions of the Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADINw. NEws
(98 Stat.) 333 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 11 U.S.C., & 28 U.S.C. (1984)). As
a consequence the Judicial Council submitted another set of revisions, developed by the
Bankruptcy Rules Advisory Committee, which were approved in 1987. See I COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY, supra note 12, at 3.04[2]. In August 1989, the Judicial Conference promulgated
yet another set of revisions to the Bankruptcy Rules made necessary by the Bankruptcy Judges,
United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554,
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmin. NEws (100 Stat.) 3088. Most recently the Advisory Committee
has promulgated a draft of revised 'Official Bankruptcy Forms in order to accommodate the
introduction of electronic systems for performing bankruptcy case docketing and noticing
functions in the bankruptcy courts and the increased number of bankruptcy case filings.
COMMITrTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UrTED STATES, PRELInNARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED OFFcIAL BANKRUPTCY FoRMS vii (1990).
47. In most cases dealing with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7004(d) courts
have not addressed the issue of whether the defendant had minimum contacts with the forum
state or district because of their rulings that such contacts were not necessary for personal
jurisdiction to be asserted. Nevertheless, many cases exist in which it is doubtful that the
defendant had such minimum contacts. See Nordberg v. Granfinanciera S.A. (In re Chase &
Sanborn Corp.), 835 F.2d 1341, 1344 (1lth Cir. 1988), rev'd and remanded on other grounds,
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 109 S.Ct. 2782, 106 L.Ed.2d 26 (1989); Teitelbaum v.
Choquette & Co. (In re Outlet Department Stores, Inc.), 82 Bankr. 694 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1988) (holding that due process under Fifth Amendment requires only that service be reasonably
calculated to inform defendant of pendency of proceedings); Wyandotte Industries v. E.Y.
Neill & Co. (In re First Hartford Corp.), 63 Bankr. 479 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law adopted by district court No. 81 B 10390, Adv. No.
82-5456A (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1987); Pongetti v. Laws (In re Self), 51 Bankr. 683 (Bankr.
D.N.D. Miss. 1985); B.W. Dev. Co. v. John B. Pike & Son, Inc. (In re B.W. Dev. Co.), 49
Bankr. 129 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985); Allard v. Benjamin (In re DeLorean Motor Co.), 49
Bankr. 900 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985); Coby Glass Prods. Co. v. Torigian Labs, Inc. (In re
Coby Glass Prods. Co.), 22 Bankr. 961 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1982); In re Schack Glass Industries,
Co., 20 Bankr. 967, 970 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); Whippany Paper Board Co. v. Victory
Container Corp. (In re Whippany Paper Board Co.), 15 Bankr. 312, 4 Collier Bankr. Cas.
2d (MB) 370 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981); Whitlock v. Worrall (In re American Aluminum Window
Corp.), 15 Bankr. 803 (D. Mass. 1981); Nixon Mach. Co. v. Roy Energy, Inc. (In re Nixon
Mach. Co.), 15 Bankr. 131 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981); Beasley v. Kelco Foods, Inc. (In re
Trim-Lean Meat Prods., Inc.), 11 Bankr. 1010 (D. Del. 1981); Scott v. Fort Ord Fed. Credit
Union (In re G. Weeks Sec., Inc.), 5 Bankr. 220 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1980).
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unrealized potential that these rules may combine to induce an otherwise
financially robust business to seek the protection of the bankruptcy laws
solely to take advantage of the convenience of being able to consolidate
geographically disparate litigation in one nearby forum. 41
III. MNDAM CONTACTS, DUE PROCESS, AND NATIONWIDE SERVICE OF
PROCESS
A. Development of Minimum Contacts Analysis under the Fourteenth
Amendment
1. Introduction
The danger described above exists only because of the generally accepted
rule that where Congress has provided for nationwide service of process,
minimum contacts with the United States, or any part of it, are sufficient
to satisfy the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 49 This rule, as will
48. See Gulf Oil-Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (stating that plaintiff may
not vex, harass, or oppress defendant by inflicting an expense or trouble not necessary to
plaintiff's own right); Aaron, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: The Full-Employment-
for-Lawyers's Bill-Part III Business Bankruptcy, 1979 UTAH L. REv. 405, 451-454; Blair,
The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 CoLtrM. L. Ray. 1 (1929);
McAllen, Deference to the Plaintiff in Forum Non Conveniens, 13 S. ILL. U. L.J. 191, 211-
212 (1989); see generally In re A.H. Robbins, Co., 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir.) (affirming order
confirming plan of reorganization), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 376 (1989). But see In re Ravick
Corp., 106 Bankr. 834 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1989) (dismissing Chapter 11 petition as having been
brought in bad faith solely to remove civil dispute to federal court).
Others have noted substantive inducements for forum shopping among debtors who use
the Bankruptcy Code to resolve their financial difficulties. See, e.g., Baird, Loss Distribution,
Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. Cm. L. Rav. 815, 822 (1987).
A bankruptcy court might dismiss a case brought exclusively for this reason if the court
finds that "the interests of creditors and the debtor would be better served by such dis-
missal .... ." 11 U.S.C. § 305 (1988).
49. The courts of appeals uniformly have permitted personal jurisdiction to be asserted
over a defendant with national contacts where Congress has authorized nationwide service of
process. See Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978) (affirming validity of nationwide
service provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)), rev'd on other grounds, 444 U.S. 527 (1980); Texas
Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981) (finding
valid nationwide service made pursuant to Federal Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28
U.S.C. § 1608), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc. 519 F.2d
974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); Universal Display & Sign Co. v. Del Mar
News Agency, 541 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976) (affirming validity of nationwide service pursuant
to former Bankruptcy Rule 704(c)); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974) (approving
nationwide service under what is now 15 U.S.C. § 78aa); Home v. Adolph Coors Co., 684
F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1982); Hogue v. Milodon Engineering, Inc., 736 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1984)
(applying former Bankruptcy Rule 704(d)); FTC v. Jim Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251 (5th Cir.
1981) (authorizing nationwide service in cases brought by FTC in districts in which investigation
is being conducted, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1988)); Haile v. Henderson Nat '1 Bank, 657
F.2d 816 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1982) (permitting nationwide service in
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be seen below, rests upon the premise that the minimum contacts require-
ment is derived from the limits on the territorial sovereignty of state and
federal court systems. One of the main purposes of this article is to show
that this premise is seriously flawed. It will further show that the flaw has
been recognized by the United States Supreme Court which, at least until
recently, appeared poised to overturn the rule permitting a federal court to
exercise personal jurisdiction over a geographically distant defendant merely
because of that person's contacts with the United States generally.
Most issues regarding the propriety of a federal district court's personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant are governed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. In all actions based on the diversity of the parties' citizenship 0
and in most cases involving the district court's authority over cases involving
a federal question,- the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
applies because Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
for service of process consistently with the long-arm statute of the state in
which the district court is located. 2 However, the Fifth Amendment applies
when a federal statute authorizes nationwide service of process. 3 Neverthe-
less, there is no reason to believe that the requirements of the Fifth
Amendment will vary considerably from those imposed upon a state court
federal receivership, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1692 (1988)); Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d
330 (7th Cir. 1979) (allowing nationwide service in securities fraud actions, pursuant to 15
U.S.C. § 78aa (1988)); Securities Investors Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309 (9th
Cir. 1985) (applying nationwide service in securities fraud cases); US Telecom, Inc. v. Hubert,
678 F. Supp. 1500 (D. Kan. 1987) (applying nationwide service under ERISA); Briggs v.
Goodwin, 569 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Stafford v. Briggs,
444 U.S. 527 (1980) (approving nationwide service under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1988)); see also
Berger, Acquiring in Personam Jurisdiction in Federal Question Cases: Procedural Frustration
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4, 1982 UTAH L. REv. 285, 318-20; Note, Nationwide
Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 6, at 1123.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988); See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985);
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984). This practice, however, is not
constitutionally mandated. See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. UPI, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
51. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1333-1364 (1988). See generally 5 C. Wsuoffr & A. Mu.mtR,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, §§ 1117-1118 (1987) [hereinafter FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE].
At least one commentator has argued that Rule 4 permits nationwide service of process
in federal question cases. See Berger, supra note 49, at 318-25.
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e). See Arrowsmith v. UPI, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963); Fullerton,
supra note 6, at 4 & n.
53. See Handley v. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co., 732 F.2d 1265, 1271 (6th Cir. 1984).
Every court of appeals called upon to address the issue of minimum contacts in a federal
question case governed by a nationwide service of process statute has applied the Fifth
Amendment and has used a national contacts standard. See 4 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE,
supra note 51, § 1067.1, at 3318 n.24; Note, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 6,
at 1140 n.149; see also sources cited supra note 49. The Supreme Court's decision in Omni
Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97 (1987), assumed that the Fifth Amendment
governed the ability of a federal court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident of
the United States.
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under the Fourteenth Amendment,m even though the parameters of the
debate are quite different.
Modern Fourteenth Amendment analysis of a defendant's amenability
to process began with the Supreme Court's 1945 decision in International
Shoe Co. v. State of Washington.55 There the Court determined that the
activities of a Delaware Corporation, whose principal place of business was
in Missouri, in employing a sales force to solicit orders in the state of
Washington, constituted sufficient minimum contacts with the State of
Washington that Washington State Courts could assert personal jurisdiction
over the defendant consistently with the due process requirements of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, even though the defendant was not
otherwise "present" in Washington .
6
Since International Shoe the Supreme Court has employed this "mini-
mum contacts" test as its mainstay approach in determining whether a state
court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. 7 As
indicated earlier, in bankruptcy litigation, service is accomplished under the
nationwide service of process provision of Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d). Al-
though the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the power of the
federal government,"8 the due process concerns for fairness and the avoidance
of undue governmental burdens that lie behind the Fifth Amendment
generally are thought to be the same as those commonly associated with
the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 Thus, the minimum contacts decisions of the
Supreme Court under the Fourteenth Amendment are relevant to an analysis
of the minimum contacts that may be required by the Fifth Amendment
for a federal court to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident and
perhaps geographically distant party.60
The minimum contacts test, and restrictions on the exercise of personal
jurisdiction generally, have historically been based on perceived limits of
the territorial sovereignty of the states. These limitations can be traced to
54. See Fullerton, supra note 6, at 14-16.
55. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
56. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319-20 (1945).
57. See McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235 (1958); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102 (1987); Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97 (1987); Burnham v.
Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
58. E.g., Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 157 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds,
444 U.S. 527 (1980).
59. E.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (stating that procedural due process
imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of liberty or property
interest within meaning of Due Process Clause of Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments); Texas
Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 314-15 n.37 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
60. See Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97 (1987).
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the use of forms of trespass in most civil actions at common law6' and the
practical need to have physical power over a defendant's assets in order to
levy on a judgment.62 This led to the notion that a court's physical control
over a defendant was the sine qua non of a valid judgment. 63 Thus, the
rule developed that a person could not, without his consent, be haled into
court as a defendant unless he could be found within the territorial bound-
aries of the court's jurisdiction."
2. Jurisdiction Based on Territorial Sovereignty
The classic case of Pennoyer v. Neff'S defined the territorial approach
to personal jurisdiction." In deciding against a state court's attempt to
assert jurisdiction over a defendant not present in the forum state, the
Supreme Court explained that:
[t]he several States are of equal dignity and authority, and the
independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others.
And so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that
the laws of one State have no operation outside of its territory,
except so far as is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal estab-
lished by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to
subject either persons or property to its decisions.67
61. See 4 FEDR PRAcncE & PROCEDuRE, supra note 51, at 228.
62. Id.; Dodd, Jurisdiction in Personal Actions, 23 ILL. L. Rsv. 427, 427-28 (1929).
63. 4 FEDER. PRAcTiCE & PROCEDuRE, supra note 51, at 229; see REsTATE~mN (FrsT)
or CoNmCTs OF LAws §§ 77-78 (1934); Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction,
73 H.Av. L. Rv. 909, 915-16 (1960); Levy, Mesne Process in Personal Actions at Common
Law and the Power Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 52 (1968); Ross, The Shifting Basis of Jurisdiction,
17 MINN. L. REv. 146, 148 (1933). But see Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal
Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956) (questioning
historical basis for territorial approach to personal jurisdiction).
64. See FEDERAL PRACTiCE & PRoCEDuRE, supra note 51, at 229 & n.8; Drobak, supra
note 3, at 1022; Wasserman, The Subpoena Power: Pennoyer's Last Vestige, 74 MiNN. L.
Rv. 37, 50-52 (1989).
65. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
66. See Drobak, supra note 3, at 1026-28. In Pennoyer, Neff brought the action to eject
Pennoyer from Oregon property that Pennoyer claimed under a sheriff's deed. The sheriff's
deed had been obtained by Pennoyer at an execution sale following a judgment obtained
against Neff in an action for services rendered to Neff by one Mitchell. At the time of the
suit by Mitchell against Neff, Neff was not a resident of Oregon, and service was obtained
upon Neff by publication. Neff failed to appear in the suit brought by Mitchell, and after the
entry of a default judgment against him personally, his Oregon property was sold to Pennoyer
at an otherwise valid execution sale. Neff asserted that Pennoyer's title was defective because
the state court had not properly obtained jurisdiction over Neff, who made no appearance in
the action, nor over his Oregon property by a proper attachment) The Court affirmed the
judgment below in favor of Neff on the premise that "no State can exercise direct jurisdiction
and authority over persons or property without its territory."
67. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
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Thus, the Supreme Court adopted the concept of territorial sovereignty as
the basis for limits on a court's power to obtain personal jurisdiction over
a non-resident defendant. 8
The Court's indication that this limitation on a court's power was
derived from the constitution was equally important.
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution, the validity of such judgments may be directly ques-
tioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground
that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal
rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no
jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law.
69
Ever since Pennoyer the Court has relied on the Due Process Clauses of
the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments as the basis for its decisions outlining
the limits of personal jurisdiction.
70
The Court's notion of what was necessary to provide due process
expanded dramatically as modern methods of communication and trans-
portation transformed the United States.7' Despite this expansion beyond
the limitations articulated in Pennoyer, it was not until the Supreme Court's
1945 decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington72 that the Court
68. Drobak, supra note 3, at 1026-33; Lewis, The Three Deaths of "State Sovereignty"
and the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 NoTRE DAME
LAW. 699, 702-05 (1983); Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HAuv. L. R-v.
610, 619 (1988); Wasserman, supra note 64, at. 51-52. Despite this, commentators have noted
that the limits imposed by Pennoyer were based more on a concern for protecting the individual
liberty interests of distant defendants, who might not have had an opportunity to defend, than
out of a concern for limiting the territorial sovereignty of the forum state. Drobak, supra
note 3, at 1023-24; Kogan, supra note 20, at 273; Redish, supra note 3, at 1124.
Justice Story's reliance in Pennoyer on notions of governmental sovereignty, borrowed
from public international law, has been much criticized as out of place when applied to a
federal union of previously independent states. Kogan, supra note 20, at 278 & n.91; Redish,
supra note 3, at 1120-21; Whitten, supra note 3, at (Part 2) 738-835.
69. Id. at 733. The Fourteenth Amendment had not'been adopted at the time the Oregon
court asserted jurisdiction over Neff in the original action brought by Mitchell. Therefore, the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause could not have governed the outcome in
Pennoyer. Kurland, supra note 3, at 572; Redish, supra note 3, at 1115 n.25; Whitten, supra
note 3, at 504-05; Lewis, Supra note 68, at 703 n.21. Nevertheless, the Court has consistently
assumed that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the principle source of
the minimum contacts doctrine.
70. See Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and
Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WAsH. L. R-v. 479, 503-08 (1987) (characterizing Pennoyer as
manifestation of now discredited 19th century view of substantive due process).
71. S& Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940) (holding that domiciliary of state subject
to jursidiction of state even though not present at time of service); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S.
352 (1927) (subjecting nonresident motorist to jurisdiction based on implied consent); Lafayette
Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855) (justifying jurisdiction over foreign
corporations on theory of consent as condition of doing business); Rothschild, Jurisdiction of
Foreign Corporations in Personam, 17 VA. L. Ray. 129 (1930); Wasserman, supra note 64, at
52-53; Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAjv. L. Rav. 909, 921 (1960).
72. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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implemented its modem "minimum contacts" test for resolving questions
of personal jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment. The minimum
contacts test developed in International Shoe did not reject state sovereignty
as a basis for personal jurisdiction, but emphasized the importance of
fairne.s to the defendant as the principal basis for its decision.7 3 Thus,
while state sovereignty played a role in the Court's analysis of personal
jurisdiction, "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" sup-
planted sovereignty as the dominant concern. 74
The Court's concern that these notions of fair play and substantial
justice be satisfied was expressed in the development of two basic branches
of personal jurisdiction first suggested in International Shoe: general and
specific jurisdiction.7 - General jurisdiction referred to the power to adjudi-
cate any controversy based on the relationship between the forum and the
defendant.7 6 In cases asserting general jurisdiction it was held that a defen-
dant with substantial or continuous and systematic contacts with a state
could be subject to personal jurisdiction in that state even if the cause of
action was unrelated to the defendant's activities in the state." Specific
jurisdiction refers to the power to adjudicate a controversy because of the
relationship between the defendant's contact with the forum and the con-
troversy itself.78 In cases falling within the scope of specific jurisdiction a
defendant who lacked the type of continuous and systematic contacts
required for general jurisdiction could nevertheless be subject to personal
73. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317, 324-25; see Fullerton,
supra note 6, at 10-11; Twitchell, supra note 68, at 625.
74. 326 U.S. at 320. See Lewis, supra note 68, at 706; Wasserman, supra note 64, at
54.
75. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317-18. The distinction was first explained by
von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv.
1121 (1966), and still engenders considerable debate. Compare Brilmayer, Related Contacts
and Personal Jurisdiction, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1444 (1988) with Twitchell, supra note 68, at
610.
76. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 75, at 1136-44; see generally Brilmayer,
Haverkamp, Logan, Lynch, Neuwirth & O'Brien, A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66
TEx. L. REv. 723, 727-72 (1988) (examining meaning of general jurisdiction); Brilmayer, supra
note 75, at 1444-50 (discussing usefulness of terms general and specific); Brilmayer, How
Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup. CT. REv.
77, 80-81 (noting contacts supporting general jurisdiction); Twitchell, supra note 68, at 614-
43; Twitchell, A Rejoinder to Professor Brilmayer, 101 HARv. L. Rav. 1465, 1465-70 (1988);
Richman, Part I-Casad's Jurisdiction in Civil Actions, Part Il-A Sliding Scale to Supplement
the Distinction Between General and Specific Jurisdiction (Book Review), 72 CAJU. L. REv.
1328, 1336-46 (1984) (examining cases satisfying neither general nor specific jurisdictional tests).
77. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318; Cubbage v. Merchent, 744 F.2d 665 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005 (1985); Hunt v. Erie Ins. Group., 728 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir.
1984); see FaDRAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 51, at 257.
Recently the Supreme Court has questioned whether jurisdiction based on a defendant's
continuous and systematic contacts with a jurisdiction, unrelated to the cause of action involved
in the dispute, can properly be asserted in an action against an individual defendant. See
Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2110 n.1 (1990).
78. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 75, at 1136, 1144-63.
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jurisdiction in a particular forum if the more limited contacts the defendant
had with the forum were those which gave rise to the action. 79 The distinction
between general and specific jurisdiction, although modified somewhat since
International Shoe,80 is the dominant theme in the modern personal juris-
diction decisions. 8'
In the years since International Shoe the Supreme Court has been
unclear about whether the primary focus of its due process analysis in
minimum contacts cases is on individual liberty or territorial sovereignty u
In Hanson v. Denckla,83 decided in 1958, the court noted that its minimum
contacts decisions represented "more than a guarantee of immunity from
inconvenient or distant litigation."' ' Instead, the Court insisted that those
limits were "a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the
respective States.""5 Nearly twenty years later, in 1977, the Court in Shaffer
v. Heitner6 refused to permit quasi-in-rem jurisdiction to be asserted over
a defendant merely because the defendant owned property in the forum
state. Rather, the Court applied the minimum contacts test of International
Shoe and rejected state sovereignty as a basis for the assertion of personal
jurisdiction. 7
In 1980, in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson8 the Court
more directly addressed the respective roles of state sovereignty and fairness
to the defendant in due process minimum contacts analysis under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 9 There the Court identified what it specifically
recognized as "two related, but distinguishable, functions" of the Fourteenth
Amendment's minimum contacts test: "[ilt protects the defendant against
the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to
ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the
limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal
system."' 9 The Court's inclusion of state sovereignty as one of the relevant
factors was a retreat from its dictum in Schaffer.9'
79. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Elkart Engineering Corp. v.
Dornier Werke, 343 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1965); Dommel's Hotel, Inc. v. East West Helicopter,
Inc., 580 F. Supp. 15 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
80. Brilmayer, supra note 75, at 1444-50 (discussing usefulness of terms "general" and
"specific").
81. See, e.g., Twitchell, supra note 68, at 610-11, 680.
82. See Twitchell, supra note 68, at 625 n.70.
83. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
84. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958). See Wasserman, supra note 64, at
57.
85. 357 U.S. at 251.
86. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
87. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 212 (1977).
88. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. involved a product liability
action against an out-of-state automobile retailer and its wholesaler, neither of which did
business in Oklahoma, the forum state.
89. See Lewis, supra note 68, at 706-18.
90. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980).
91. See Fullerton, supra note 6, at 12-13; Lewis, supra note 68, at 710-11.
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Further, Justice White's opinion for the Court paid tribute to the
federalist context in which decisions about personal jurisdiction are made.
While admitting the importance of not imposing undue burdens on a
defendant, Justice White emphasized that "we have never accepted the
proposition that state lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes, nor
could we, and remain faithful to the principles of interstate federalism
embodied in the Constitution."92 His opinion further indicated that the Due
Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate federalism, would
divest a state of its power to assert jurisdiction over a defendant who lacked
contacts with the forum state, despite the relative convenience for the
defendant in litigating before the tribunals of that state.93
Thus, while protecting defendants from unfair burdens was an appro-
priate consideration, World-Wide Volkswagen indicated that protecting the
federalist system of sovereign sister states was the primary concern behind
the minimum contacts requirements of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
3. Protection of Individual Liberty
In 1982 the Court dramatically revived the position asserted in Schaffer
and reasserted the importance of protecting defendants' interest in individual
liberty and the avoidance of undue burdens as the driving force behind its
minimum contacts decisions. In Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinee4 the Court held that a federal district court could
properly assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, as a
sanction, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3795 for the defendant's
failure to comply with a discovery order relating to the question of personal
jurisdiction. Justice White, in an opinion joined by seven other Justices,
indicated that "[tihe personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and pro-
tects an individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial
power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty."96
Justice White further noted that:
The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a function
of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process
Clause. That Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction
requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism
concerns.Y
92. 444 U.S. at 293 (1980).
93. Id. at 294.
94. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
95. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
96. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee , 456 U.S. 694, 702
(1982). See Kogan, supra note 20, at 263-64 n.38.
97. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
702-03 n.10.
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The Court's rationale in Insurance Corp. of Ireland appeared to reject the
emphasis on state sovereignty stressed by the court in World-Wide Volks-
wagen and established instead that the primary concern behind the minimum
contacts standards of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is individual
liberty.98
Until recently, the Court's personal jurisdiction decisions have consis-
tently emphasized the importance of avoiding undue burdens on the defen-
dant and de-emphasized the relevance of federalism and the limits it imposes
on state sovereignty. In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.99 Justice Rehnquist
balanced the defendant's right to fairness with the state of New Hampshire's
interest in holding a defendant responsible for claims related to the defen-
dant's activities within that state. 100
Subsequently, in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz'01 the Court permitted
an assertion of personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff's nonresident fran-
chisee based on the substantial and continuing relationship of the defendant
with the plaintiff's corporate headquarters in the forum state. Justice
Brennan's opinion for the Court stressed the purpose of the Due Process
Clause as "protect[ing] an individual's liberty interest in not being subject
to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no
meaningful 'contacts, ties, or relations." ' "102 Justice Brennan underscored
this point by emphasizing the Court's ruling in Insurance Corp. of Ireland
that "[a]lthough this protection operates to restrict state power, it 'must be
seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by
98. See generally Braveman, Interstate Federalism and Personal Jurisdiction, 33 SYRAcUsE
L. Ray. 533, 540-54 (1982) (regarding Court's reliance on state sovereignty and federalism);
Gottlieb, In Search of the Link Between Due Process and Jurisdiction, 60 WAsH. U.L.Q.
1291, 1299 (1983) (criticizing any role for state sovereignty in design of Due Process Clause);
Drobak, supra note 3, at 1046-48; Kogan, supra note 20, at 263-64 n.38; Lewis, supra note
68, at 718-27; Lilly, Jurisdiction Over Domestic and Alien Defendants, 69 VA. L. Ray. 85,
109 (1983); Redish, supra note 3, at 1120-42 (1981) (contending that federalism should play
no role in questions of personal jurisdiction); Stewart, A New Litany of Personal Jurisdiction,
60 U. CoLo. L. REv. 5, 8 n.15 (1989); Twitchell, supra note 68, at 625 n.70; Wasserman,
supra note 64, at 58-59. But see Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the
Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEx. L. REv. 689, 707 (1987) (arguing that absent concern
with sovereignty, due process limits on personal jurisdiction will be indistinguishable from
change of venue).
99. 465 U.S. 770 (1984).
100. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 798 (1984). The plaintiff, whose
own contacts with the forum state were limited, brought suit on a libel claim and asserted
personal jurisdiction, for damages arising from the nationwide distribution of the defendant's
publication, based on the defendant's sales of copies of its magazines in the forum state. Id.
at 796. The court permitted the assertion of personal jurisdiction even though the bulk of the
plaintiff's injuries were sustained outside the state in question. Id. at 796, 800. See also Calder
v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (deeming sufficient defendant's intentional conduct as basis for
assertion of jurisdiction where conduct was calculated to cause injury in forum state).
101. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
102. Id. at 471-72 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319
(1945)).
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the Due Process Clause' rather than as a function of federalism concerns." 0
The Court's rejection of federalism as a source of the minimum contacts
requirement of the Due Process Clause is further accentuated in Burger
King by the Court's reiteration of the generally accepted rule that defendants
may waive the minimum contacts requirement.104 Constitutional limitations
on the powers of the several states, vis-a-vis one another, would not seem
to be the sort of concerns that could be waived by individual parties.'05
Rather, the ability of an individual to waive a limitation on a state's power
points more toward a limitation designed primarily, if not exclusively, for
the protection of the individual in question. The mere fact that the Four-
teenth Amendment imposes its limits on coequal states does nothing to
suggest that the Due Process Clause's protection is derived from the fed-
eralist nature of the union. 106
More recently, in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, the
Supreme Court prevented a California court's attempt to assert jurisdiction
over a Japanese company based on its sales of components to a Taiwanese
concern which incorporated the components into finished goods ultimately
sold in the American market. 107 An important portion of Justice O'Connor's
opinion indicated that permitting the assertion of personal jurisdiction under
the circumstances of the case, "would offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."' 08 This portion of the opinion rested on the
Court's consideration of five factors: "[1] the burden on the defendant, [2]
the interests of the forum State . . ." [3] the interests of the plaintiff, [4]
the interest of 'the interstate judicial system ... in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of the [controversy] combined with [5] the shared interest
of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social poli-
cies.," 09
Justice Brennan, in an opinion joined by Justices White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, agreed with O'Connor's conclusion that "the exercise of personal
jurisdiction ... in this case would not comport with 'fair play and sub-
103. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472, n.13 (quoting Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03, n.10 (1982)); see Drobak, supra
note 3, at 1016; Wasserman, supra note 64, at 92. In Burger King, however, the Court
considered the state's interest in exercising jurisdiction relevant. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473.
This has led some commentators to characterize reports of the death of federalism as premature.
See Kogan, supra note 20, at 263-64 n.38; see generally Stein, supra note 98 (supporting role
of federalism in jurisdictional decisions).
104. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472 & n.14.
105. Cf. 13 FEDERAL PRACTCE & PROCEDURE, supra note 51, § 3522 (stating that parties
cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction on federal court nor can they waive lack of jurisdiction
by consent, conduct, or estoppel); FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (same).
106. But see 4 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 51, § 1067, at 293.
107. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
108. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (quoting
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
109. Id. at 113 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292
(1980)).
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stantial justice ... ."'0 In a separate concurrance, Justice Stevens, joined
by Justices White and Blackmun, expressed a similar belief that an exami-
nation of minimum contacts was unnecessary in cases like Asahi where the
burden on the defendant combined with the negligible interest of the state
in asserting jurisdiction made it unreasonable and unfair to assert jurisdic-
tion."' Thus, a majority of the court, consisting of Justices Brennan, White,
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, concluded that unfairness to the defen-
dant prevented an assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant regardless of
whether it had engaged in the type of conduct that would have resulted in
a conclusion that it purposefully availed itself of the California market for
its products.
After Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Burger King, and Asahi, at least one
aspect of the Court's minimum contacts analysis should have been clear:
the Court's primary concern was fairness toward the defendant. The Court
would reject an assertion of personal jurisdiction where the burden on the
defendant is severe and the interest of the state and the judicial system
generally, in asserting jurisdiction over the defendant, is slight." 2 This will
be true regardless of whether the defendant has purposefully availed itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state.
The Court's most recent analysis of the standards for asserting personal
jurisdiction raises more questions about this analysis than it resolves. In
Burnham v. Superior Court"3 the Court unanimously concluded that per-
sonal jurisdiction could be asserted over a nonresident defendant who was
served while present in the forum state without analyzing the extent of the
defendant's other contacts with the forum. The Court was, however, seri-
ously divided over the rationale that supported this result. Although Burn-
ham did not involve service on a geographically distant defendant, the
disparate views expressed by members of the Court regarding the meaning
of due process are likely to have an impact on any evaluation by the Court
of the validity of nationwide service of process provisions like Bankruptcy
Rule 7004(d).
Justice Scalia's conclusion that the defendant's mere presence in the
state was a sufficient basis for asserting jurisdiction was founded on the
assertion that "jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due
process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system
that define the due process standard of 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."' ' 4 He indicated that this standard, originally articulated
in International Shoe, was developed merely as an "analogy to 'physical
110. Id. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945)); see McAllen, supra note 48, at 201-202 & 201 n.30.
111. 480 U.S. at 121 (Stevens, J., concurring).
112. See generally Degnan & Kane, The Exercise of Jurisdiction Over and Enforcement
of Judgments Against Alien Defendants, 39 HAsTImos L.J. 799 (1988); Perdue, supra note 70,
at 509-10; Stewart, supra note 98.
113. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990).
114. Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2115 (1990).
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presence,' and [that] it would be perverse to say it could now be turned
against that touchstone of jurisdiction.""' 5
In a portion of his opinion in which only Justices Kennedy and
Rehnquist joined, Justice Scalia re-emphasized that the validation of the
practice of asserting personal jurisdiction based on mere presence "is its
pedigree,""16 and that when "a jurisdictional principle is both firmly ap-
proved by tradition and still favored, it is impossible to imagine what
standard we could appeal to for the judgment that it is 'no longer justi-
fied."' 17 In this portion of his opinion, Scalia went even further to challenge
the notion, expressed in the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan,"" that
contemporary notions of due process should include consideration of any
concern for fairness that is not recognized in the traditional and historic
practices in the United States." 9
Justice Scalia's position that the traditional acceptance of a jurisdictional
practice imbues that practice with a due process pedigree that is sufficient
to withstand modem due process based challenges to the propriety of the
practice has broad ramifications for due process as we currently understand
it. His position is particularly relevant to the analysis proposed in this
article that questions the validity of nationwide service of process despite
our long and traditional acquiescence in the practice.
The rest of the Court in Burnham agreed with the result, but not with
Justice Scalia's reasoning. Justice White questioned Scalia's broad assertion
that traditionally accepted procedures could not be declared invalid. 20 Justice
Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor, criticized
Justice Scalia's "reliance solely on historical pedigree."' 2' Justice Brennan
based his conclusion instead, on the ability of the defendant to have
reasonably predicted his vulnerability to suit in the forum state by virtue
of his voluntary visit to the forum.12
Brennan's view then is consistent with the premise of this article: that
the constitutional validity of a particular assertion of personal jurisdiction
has more to do with the reasonableness of the burdens imposed on the
defendant than on the territorial sovereignty of the forum.
23
115. Id. at 2115 (emphasis in original).
116. Id. at 2116.
117. Id. at 116.
118. Id. at 2120, 2122-26 (Brennan, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 2117-19.
120. Id. at 2119 (White, J., concurring).
121. Id. at 2120.
122. Id. at 2124 (Brennan, J., concurring).
123. Justice Steven's opinion in Burnham added little to the Court's analysis because he
indicated merely that his concurrence in the result was swayed by the historical consensus
noted by Justice Scalia, the fairness considerations expressed by Justice Brennan, and the
common sense of Justice White. 110 S. Ct. at 2126 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens
at least continues to acknowledge, as he did in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218-19 (1977)
(Stevens, J., concurring), that the Court is properly concerned with the fairness of the forum's
assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and therefore presumably not with
territorial power alone.
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The impact of Burnham on the Court's analysis of nationwide service
of process provisions will depend on whether the views expressed in that
case by Justice Scalia or those of Justice Brennan command a majority of
the newly constituted Court. Justice Scalia's willingness to rely on the
historical pedigree of a jurisdictional practice, combined with the tradition
of permitting Congress to provide for nationwide service, would surely result
in the Court's approval of the practice, despite a defendant's lack of contacts
with the forum state. Justice Brennan's approach, on the other hand, with
its emphasis on the ability of the defendant to reasonably predict his
vulnerability to suit in the forum, would appear to support the analysis
proffered by this article.
Under any reading of Burnham the role of state sovereignty in minimum
contacts analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment remains unclear. In
cases dealing with nationwide service of process statutes, like Bankruptcy
Rule 7004(d), however, where the extent of the defendant's contacts with
the nation as a whole are certain, state sovereignty is not an issue. Rather,
with the basic question of governmental power satisfied, the only remaining
issue is the extent to which the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
requires something more than national minimum contacts before personal
jurisdiction can be obtained over a geographically distant party. The next
section will describe and analyze cases which have discussed the contention
that nationwide service of process should be tempered by a concern, based
on the Fifth Amendment, with procedural fairness toward the defendant.
B. Judicial Treatment of Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d) and Other Nationwide
Service of Process Statutes
Most courts have rejected the contention that the Fifth Amendment
imposes restrictions upon nationwide service of process statutes like Bank-
ruptcy Rule 7004(d).11 Such courts have summarily concluded that national
contacts alone are sufficient to justify assertion of personal jurisdiction over
a defendant, regardless of the lack of contacts the defendant has with the
forum or the burden imposed on the defendant of having to defend in a
geographically distant or otherwise inconvenient location. 25 Many of these
124. E.g., Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974) (approving nationwide service
of process under § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976));
Hogue v. Milodon Engineering, Inc. (In re Hogue), 736 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1984) (approving
nationwide service under former FED. R. BANKR. P. 704). For a more complete list of
authorities see note 6, supra.
125. See Haile v. Henderson National Bank, 657 F.2d 816 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 949 (1982) (asserting personal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1682 (1988), permitting
federal receiver to sue in any federal judicial district); Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir.
1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980) (relying on
28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1988) in permitting nationwide service of process in actions against federal
officers or employees acting under color of legal authority); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138
(2d. Cir. 1974) (accomplishing nationwide service under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1986) in actions
for violations of the Securities Act of 1934).
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decisions were reached prior to the Supreme Court's shift, in Insurance
Corp. of Ireland, away from reliance on territorial sovereignty, and toward
the need to avoid imposing undue burdens on a geographically distant
party.'2 Others, decided since Insurance Corp. of Ireland, simply have
rejected the analogy drawn between that case and those decided under the
Fifth Amendment, 12 with some of these concluding that the opportunity
for a change of venue adequately protects defendants from the burden of
litigating in an inconvenient forum. 128 Finally, some cases have held that
the express language of Article III of the Constitution permits federal courts
to assume personal jurisdiction over anyone within the territory of the
United States. 29 The Supreme Court has never fully addressed the issue. 30
Mariash v. Morrill,3' decided before Ireland, is typical of the first
category of cases in which a defendant's resistance to nationwide service
was summarily rejected. 132 There, an action was brought alleging violations
of federal securities laws regarding manipulations of the value of publicly
traded stock. Service was accomplished under section 27 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 which authorizes nationwide service of process in
such actions. 33 Judge Tyler of the Southern District of New York dismissed
126. E.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1315 (9th Cir.
1985), cert. granted in part sub nom. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 11 S.
Ct. 1618 (1991); Waffenschmidt v. MacKay, 763 F.2d 711, 722-23 (5th Cir. 1985); Johnson
Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc., 743 F.2d 947 (Ist Cir. 1984) (stating: "If a person
is served within the territory of the sovereign represented by the issuing court, there is no
question that maintenance of the suit against him will not offend traditional notions of
fairness."); Trans-Asiatic Oil, Ltd., S.A. v. Apex Oil Co., 743 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1984); Piper
Acceptance Corp. v. Slaughter, 600 F. Supp. 169 (D. Colo. 1985).
127. See Lapeyrouse v. Texaco, Inc., 693 F.2d 581 (5th-Cir. 1982), overruled on other
grounds by Point Landing, Inc. v. Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd., 795 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1986);
Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Hillblom (In re Continental Air Lines, Inc.), 61 Bankr. 758
(1986); GRM v. Equine Investment & Management Group, 596 F. Supp. 307 (S.D. Tex. 1984);
Bamford v. Hobbs, 569 F. Supp. 160, 164-67 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
128. See infra text accompanying notes 157-90.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 191-200.
130. Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 108 S. Ct. 404, 408 n.5 (1987) (declining
to address issue); Asahi Metal Ind. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (declining
to address issue); see Note, Pendent Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 6, at 124-128.
In Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980), the Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e),
providing for nationwide service of process in certain actibns, did not apply to actions of the
type involved in the case brought against federal officials in their individual capacities. 444
U.S. at 544-45. Justice Stewart's dissent took the position that the nationwide service provision
of § 1391(e) did apply, 444 U.S. at 547, and that due process required only that a defendant
have minimum contacts with the sovereign authority that created the court. 444 U.S. at 554.
Justice Brennan joined in this dissenting opinion. 444 U.S. at 545.
131. 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974).
132. See Lusardi, supra note 6, at 17-18; Note, Fifth Amendment Limitations, supra note
6.
133. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988). The releviant portion of § 27 provides:
Any suit or action to enforce any liability or duty created by this title or rules and
regulations thereunder. . . . may be brought in any such district [wherein any act or
transaction constituting the violation occurred] or in the district wherein the defendant
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the plaintiff's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defen-
dants, all of whom had been served in Massachusetts where they resided.
34
The Second Circuit concluded that it was "too late in the day to argue that
Section 27 does not authorize nationwide service of process on any person
named in the complaint .... ,,13-
The court acknowledged the constraints of the Fifth Amendment, but
treated the Due Process Clause as requiring no more than that service "be
reasonably calculated to inform the defendant of the pendency of the
proceedings .... 11116 The court rejected the defendant's claim that minimum
contacts were also required by noting that because the defendants resided
within the territorial boundaries of the United States, the 'minimum
contacts' required to justify the federal government's exercise of power over
them, were present."' 3 7 To the court in Mariash, the defendant's assertion
of the minimum contacts doctrine was irrelevant to the issue of the consti-
tutionality of personal jurisdiction accomplished by service within the ter-
ritory of the United States pursuant to a nationwide service of process
statute. 3 8 The court's view was that Congress could authorize service over
a defendant located anywhere within the territorial boundaries of the United
States, as long as the Fifth Amendment's requirement that the defendant
be given reasonable notice of the action was satisfied. Otherwise the question
was one of territorial sovereignty alone, and in cases involving defendants
domiciled within the territorial limits of the United States, the answer to
the question was clear. The second circuit's decision in Mariash v. Morrill
is one of the leading cases in support of this reasoning and result. 3 9
is found or is an inhabitant or transacts business, and process in such cases may be
served in any other district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the
defendant may be found.
15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1986) (emphasis supplied).
134. Id. at 1139-40.
135. Id. at 1142.
136. Id. at 1143.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Go-Video, Inc. v. AKAI Electronic Co., 885 F.2d 1406, 1415 (9th Cir. 1989);
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. granted
in part sub nom. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1618 (1991);
Trans-Atlantic Oil, Ltd. v. Apex Oil Co., 743 F.2d 956, 959 (1st Cir. 1984); Johnson Creative
Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc., 743 F.2d 947, 950 (1st Cir. 1984); Haile v. Henderson Nat'l
Bank, 657 F.2d 816, 826 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1982); FTC v. Jim Walter
Corp. 651 F.2d 251, 256 n.8 (5th Cir. 1981); Klein v. Tabatchnick, 610 F.2d 1043, 1051 (2d
Cir. 1979); Blackburn v. Goodwin, 608 F.2d 919, 925 (2d Cir. 1979); Fitzsimmons v. Barton,
589 F.2d 330, 333-34 (7th Cir. 1979); Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256,
1293 n.14 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great Western United
Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 157 (lst Cir. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Stafford v. Griggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells
Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 418 (9th Cir. 1977); US Telecomm, Inc. v. Hubert, 678 F.
Supp. 1500, 1508 (D. Kan. 1987); Hirt v. UM Leasing Corp., 614 F. Supp. 1066, 1069 (D.
Neb. 1985); Rose v. Arkansas Valley Envtl. & Utility Authority, 562 F. Supp. 1180, 1211
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Bankruptcy judges, solicitous toward the validity of Bankruptcy Rule
7004(d), have been particularly enamored with the territorial analysis em-
ployed by the Mariash court. 40 In Nixon Machinery Co. v. Roy Energy,
Inc., (In re Nixon Machinery)'4' for example, a Chapter 11 debtor in
possession 42 brought an action to collect a simple debt and served process
under former Bankruptcy Rule 704, which also provided for nationwide
service of process in adversary proceedings in bankruptcy. 143 The defendant,
who claimed to lack minimum contacts with the federal district in which
the action had been brought, objected to the court's assertion of personal
(W.D. Mo. 1983); Wallace v. Millrob Corp. (In re Rusco Indus., Inc.), 104 Bankr. 548 (Bankr.
S.D. Ga. 1989); Metro Communications, Inc. v. The Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 68 Bankr.
9, 10 (W.D. Pa. 1986); Wyandotte Indus. v. E.Y. Neill & Co. (In re First Hartford Corp.),
62 Bankr. 479, 486 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); Whippany Paper Board Co. v. Victory Containter
Corp. (In re Whippany Paper Board Co.), 15 Bankr. 312, 314-15 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981); Nixon
Mach. Corp. v. Roy Energy, Inc. (In re Nixon Mach. Co.), 15 Bankr. 131, 135 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenn. 1981); Fullerton, supra note 6, at 17-18; Lilly, supra note 98, at 132; Redish, supra
note 3 (regarding state court jurisdiction under Fourteenth Amendment).
140. See Nordberg v. Granfinanciera, S.A. (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 835 F.2d
1341, 1344 (11th Cir. 1988), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782, 106 L.Ed.2d 26 (1989); Teitelbaum v. Choquette & Co. (In re
Outlet Company Stores, Inc.), 82 Bankr. 694 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that due process
under Fifth Amendment requires only that service be reasonably calculated to inform defendant
of pendency of proceedings); Wyandotte Industries v. E.Y. Neill & Co. (In re First Hartford
Corp.), 63 Bankr. 479 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law adopted by district court No. 81 B 10390, Adv. No. 82-5456A (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 1987);
Pongetti v. Laws (In re Self), 51 Bankr. 683 (Bankr. D.N.D. Miss. 1985); B.W. Development
Co., Inc. v. John B. Pike & Son, Inc. (In re B.W. Development Co., Inc.), 49 Bankr. 129
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1985); Allard v. Benjamin (In re DeLorean Motor Co.), 49 Bankr. 900
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985); Coby Glass Prods. Co. v. Torigian Labs, Inc. (In re Coby Glass
Prods. Co.), 22 Bankr. 961 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1982); In re Schack Glass Industries, Co., 20
Bankr. 967, 970 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); Whippany Paper Board Co. v. Victory Container
Corp. (In re Whippany Paper Board Co., Inc.), 15 Bankr. 312, 4 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB)
370 (Bankr. D.N.Y. 1981); Whitlock v. Worrall (In re American Aluminum Window Corp.),
15 Bankr. 803 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981); Nixon Mach. Co. v. Roy Energy, Inc. (In re Nixon
Mach. Co.), 15 Bankr. 131 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981); Beasley v. Kelco Foods, Inc. (In re
Trim-Lean Meat Prods., Inc.), 11 Bankr. 1010 (D. Del. 1981); Scott v. Fort Ord Fed. Credit
Union (In re G. Weeks Sec., Inc.), 5 Bankr. 220 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1980).
141. 15 Bankr. 131 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981).
142. In a reorganization case under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code, 11 U.S.C. §§
1101-1174 (1988), the "debtor in possession" means the debtor. Id. § 1101(1). The debtor in
possession has most of the same rights, powers, and duties that a trustee would have in a
Chapter 11 case if a trustee were to be appointed. Id. § 1107. See id. §§ 704 & 1106. The
debtor in possession thus serves as the estate's representative in the case, but, like the trustee,
owes a fiduciary duty to creditors of the estate. See 5 COLUER oN BuaNKRupTcy, supra note
12, 1106.01[2][b].
143. Former Bankruptcy Rule 704(f)(1) provided:
The summons, together with the complaint and notice of trial or pre-trial conference,
and all other process except a subpoena may be served anywhere within the United
States. "United States," as used in this subdivision, includes the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico and the territories and possessions to which the Act is or may hereafter
be applicable.
Former FED. R. BANKR. P. 704(0(1) (repealed 1983).
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jurisdiction. In this typical pre-Ireland decision the court gave short shrift
to the defendant's Fifth Amendment argument and concluded that because
a federal court can constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over any person
found within the borders of the United States, the defendant's lack of
contacts with Tennessee in particular did not control its amenability to suit
in that state's federal judicial districts.'"
Pre-Ireland decisions, such as Mariash and Nixon Machinery, draw
what has been correctly characterized as a "faulty analogy" between state
and national borders' 45 and improperly conclude that minimum contacts
with any part of the United States justifies the federal government in
compelling a person to defend a lawsuit brought in any other part of the
United States.'" These decisions completely disregard the fairness concerns
expressed in the Supreme Court's minimum contacts decisions dating as far
back as International Shoe Co. v. Washington'47 and, at their worst,
accommodate plaintiffs' interests in avoiding a full and fair litigation of
disputes by bringing the action in a forum inconvenient to the defendant.'"
This latter concern is particularly salient in bankruptcy litigation where
already disaffected creditors may be reluctant to invest additional sums in
resisting the debtor's choice of forum.1
49
Post-Ireland decisions have taken the statements about the individual
liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause in Ireland seriously, but courts have felt constrained by controlling
precedent in their circuits.5 0 Other post-Ireland courts have used bankruptcy
or nonbankruptcy venue rules to evade the issue. Continental Airlines v.
Hillblom (In re Continental Airlines)5' is typical of such decisions. In that
case, a Chapter 11 debtor in possession brought an adversary proceeding
5 2
144. Nixon Mach. Co. v. Roy Energy, Inc., 15 Bankr. 131, 135 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1981). The court further noted that any unfairness that might result from this rule could be
cured by transfer of the case to a more convenient forum. Id.
145. Fullerton, supra note 6, at 16-22.
146. Id. at 19.
147. 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945); see Fullerton, supra note 6, at 19.
148. See Fullerton, supra note 6, at 20; Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947).
149. See SOUTmRN METHODIST UNIvERSrrY BANKRUPTCY LAW INsTrTUTE, REPRESENTING
DEBTORS Iw BANKRUPTCY 1.0311], at 1-12 (1987) (regarding disinclination of severely over-
extended creditors to challenge debtor's choice of venue).
150. See, e.g., Wallace v. Millrob Corp. (In re Rusco Indus., Inc.), 104 Bankr. 548, 551
n.2, 551-52 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1989).
151. 61 Bankr. 758 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
152. Adversary proceedings are conducted in the same general manner as ordinary civil
proceedings in federal district court. They include proceedings:
(1) to recover money or property, except a proceeding to compel the debtor to
deliver property to the trustee, or a proceeding under § 544(b) or § 725 of the Code,
Rule 2017, or Rule 6002, (2) to determine the validity, priority, or extent of a lien
or other interest in property, other than a proceeding under Rule 4003(d), (3) to
obtain approval pursuant to § 363(h) for the sale of both the interest of the estate
and of a co-owner in property, (4) to object to or revoke a discharge, (5) to revoke
an order of confirmation of a chapter 11, chapter 12 or chapter 13 plan, (6) to
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to enjoin certain minority shareholders of a corporation that the debtor was
attempting to acquire from pursuing litigation outside of bankruptcy court.
The defendants resisted the court's assertion of personal jurisdiction on the
grounds that they lacked sufficient minimum contacts with the forum to
permit the court to assert personal jurisdiction over them. 153 The district
court'5 4 took the defendant's objections seriously and discussed the signifi-
cance of the Fifth Amendment to the question of personal jurisdiction,"5
but concluded that the case was improperly venued and should be transferred
to the district in which the defendant resided.
1 56
Other post-Ireland courts have held that the opportunity for a change
of venue is the only source of relief for a defendant concerned with the
burden of having to defend in an inconvenient forum with which it has
few, if any, contacts. The leading bankruptcy case in support of this position
is Hogue v. Milodon Engineering, Inc. (In re Hogue).157 In Hogue, decided
after Ireland but nevertheless under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,158 a Chapter
determine the dischargeability of a debt, (7) to obtain an injunction or other equitable
relief, (8) to subordinate any allowed claim or interest, except when subordination
is provided in a chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 plan, (9) to obtain a declaratory judgment
relating to any of the foregoing, or (10) to determine a claim or cause of action
removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1452.
FE. R. BANK. P. 7001. Part VII of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which
governs adversary proceedings, closely parallels, and in many cases incorporates by reference,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. BANRr. P. 7002; advisory committee's note
FED. R. BASNKR. P. 7002.
153. Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Hillblom, 61 Bankr. 758, 764 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1986).
154. The action was initially brought in bankruptcy court. The district court, however,
"[w]ith 'one eye cocked toward the decision of the Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline
Constr. v. Marathon Oil Pipe Line Co.'..." withdrew the reference of the adversary action
from the bankruptcy court. Continental Air Lines, 61 Bankr. at 764 (quoting Holland America
Ins. Co. v. Union Bank & Central Pecan Shelling Co., 777 F.2d 992, 998 (5th Cir. 1985)).
The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
98 Stat. 333 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C., 11 U.S.C.) permits district
courts to refer bankruptcy matters to the bankruptcy court for the district in which the district
court sits. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1988). All federal judicial districts have entered general orders,
pursuant to § 157(a), referring all bankruptcy matters to the bankruptcy court for the district.
See, e.g., In re Ermco Erectors, Inc., 69 Bankr. 233 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986). The district
court may, however, withdraw its reference of any bankruptcy case or proceeding from the
bankruptcy court, for good cause shown. 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (1988). The district court is
required to withdraw a proceeding requiring consideration of both the Bankruptcy Code and
other nonbankruptcy federal laws affecting interstate commerce. Id. See, e.g., In re Tammaro,
56 Bankr. 999 (D.N.J. 1986); Ferriell, The Constitutionality of the Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 63 AM. BANcR. L.J. 109, 175 n.499 (1989).
155. Continental Air Lines, 61 Bankr. at 766.
156. Id. at 769-73.
157. 736 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1984).
158. Hogue v. Milodon Eng'g, Inc., 736 F.2d 989, 990 (4th Cir. 1984).
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was repealed with the adoption of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-598 § 401(a), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN.
NEws (92 Stat.) 2549, 2682.
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XI' s9 debtor brought an action in the bankruptcy court for the Western
District of Virginia to enjoin a former creditor from continuing an action
initiated against the debtor in California on a debt previously discharged in
the debtor's bankruptcy case. The creditor objected to the bankruptcy
court's assertion of personal jurisdiction in the bankruptcy court action to
obtain an injunction. The bankruptcy court asserted jurisdiction over the
creditor and enjoined continuation of the California suit, but was overruled
by the district court which ruled that the bankruptcy court lacked in
personam jurisdiction over the California creditor and directed the bank-
ruptcy judge to dismiss the adversary proceeding.'1° The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, ruling that the defendant's lack
of contacts with the forum state placed no limit on the bankruptcy court's
ability to obtain personal jurisdiction in the case before it.' 6' In doing so
the court rejected the distinction, advanced by the defendant, between service
of process, clearly authorized by former Bankruptcy Rule 704, and personal
jurisdiction.
Former Rule 704(f)(1), like current Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d), permitted
service of a summons in an adversary proceeding "anywhere within the
United States."1 62 It is, of course, an accepted rule that the validity of
service and personal jurisdiction are distinct concepts. 63 The court indicated
however, that the distinction was unimportant in cases involving federal
questions where a court's ability to assert jurisdiction over a defendant is
limited only by the need for congressional authorization and the constraints
of due process.'" Rule 704 provided the necessary congressional authori-
zation, and, the court reasoned, the constitutional yardstick for measuring
159. Chapter XI, along with former Chapters X and XII, were the predecessors of current
Chapter 11. See Downey, Ferriell, & Pfeiffer, The Proposed Bankruptcy Reorganization
Provisions: A Comparison of the Current Law with Chapter 11 of H.R. 8200 and S. 2266,
18 SANTA CLARA L. Ray. 567 (1978); King, The Business Reorganization Chapter of the
Proposed Bankruptcy Code-Or Whatever Happened to Chapters X, XI, and XII, 78 CoM.
L.J. 429 (1973).
Chapter X was intended to be used primarily by large publicly held corporations. Chapter
XI, on the other hand, was designed for the reorganization of smaller business enterprises.
Because Chapter X required the appointment of a trustee, and the ouster of existing manage-
ment, officers of publicly held business entities were understandably reluctant to file a case
under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act and tried, usually with little success, to reorganize
their companies under Chapter. XI which permitted management to remain in control of the
business during reorganization. See 124 CONG. Rac. 32403-32408 (1978) (statement of Rep.
Edwards). Chapter 11 of the current law eliminates the distinction between publicly and
privately held corporations, and permits current management to remain in control of the
reorganizing company unless cause exists for the appointment of a trustee. Id. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a) (1988).
160. Hogue, 736 F.2d at 990.
161. Id. at 990.
162. Former Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 704(f)(1) provided: "The summons,
together with the complaint and notice of trial, and all other process except a subpoena may
be served anywhere within the United States."
163. See 4 FEDEuL PRACTICE & PROCEDuRE, supra note 51, at §§ 1075, 1127.
164. Hogue, 736 F.2d at 991.
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due process was different in cases arising under federal law than those
involving exclusively state law because of the national character of the issues
involved.
165
This analysis, relied on in cases involving Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d),1t 6
is flawed. Instead of analyzing the interests served by nationwide service of
process in a bankruptcy context and comparing them with the burdens
placed on the defendant, the court simply reasoned that nationwide service
was constitutionally permissible because actions arising under federal law
raise issues involving federal law.
Further, the court's reasoning draws an invalid distinction between
federal question and diversity cases. Diversity actions, although arising under
purely state law, are as much at the core of the federal judicial power as
actions arising under federal law. 167
Finally, although Hogue was decided two years after the Supreme
Court's Insurance Co. of Ireland decision, the Fourth Circuit's opinion
makes no reference to the case, nor to any other due process decision of
the United States Supreme Court. This alone raises doubts about the validity
of the court's entire approach.
This can perhaps be explained by the court's reliance on the seventh
circuit's pre-Ireland decision in Fitzsimmons v. Barton.16s There, the court,
in an action brought under the nationwide service provision of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934,169 concluded that the fairness standard imposed by
the Supreme Court's minimum contacts decisions under the Fourteenth
Amendment related to the "fairness of the exercise of power by a particular
sovereign, not the fairness of imposing burdens of litigating in a distant
forum.' 70 The court indicated that the latter concern was more appropri-
ately considered in applying the judicial code's change of venue provisions.
Even though the Fitzsimmons court purported to respond to the defen-
dant's Fifth Amendment argument regarding the unfair burdens of having
to defend in an inconvenient forum, it twisted the fairness debate into a
similar rehash of the now outdated territorial sovereignty approach to
minimum contacts analysis. 71 Further, the Fitzsimmons decision was decided
before Insurance Company of Ireland and Burger King. The court thus
165. Id.
166. United States v. Premises Known as Lots 50 & 51, 2050 Brickell Ave., Miami, Fla.,
681 F. Supp. 309 (E.D.N.C. 1988); United States ex rel. Pittman Mechanical Contractors, Inc.
v. Irvine & Assoc., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 845 (E.D. Va. 1986); Sonnyco Coal, Inc. v. Bartley
(In re Sonnyco Coal, Inc.), 89 B.R. 658 (S.D. Ohio 1988); Teitelbaum v. Choquette & Co.
(In re Outlet Dept. Stores, Inc.), 82 Bankr. 694 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); Wyandotte Industries
v. E.Y. Neill & Co. (In re First Hartford Corp.), 63 Bankr. 479 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986);
Pongetti v. Laws (In re Self), 51 B.R. 683 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1985).
167. U.S. CoNsr. art III, § 2. See C. Wmoir, THE LAW OF FEDERAL CoutTs 26-27, 127-
37 (4th ed. 1983).
168. 589 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979).
169. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1986).
170. Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1979).
171. Fitzsimmons, 589 F.2d at 332-33; see Fullerton, supra note 6, at 19.
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relied on the Supreme Court's then most recent decision regarding minimum
contacts, Shaffer v. Heitner.72 The Shaffer decision emphasized the limits
on the territorial sovereignty of the forum state without regard to the
fairness or unfairness of any burdens that might be imposed upon the
defendant. In light of the Supreme Court's recent emphasis on the fairness
of imposing these burdens, decisions like Fitzsimmons, decided without the
benefit of the Supreme Court's most recent analysis of the problem, should
no longer be persuasive. 73
These arguments in favor of the constitutionality of nationwide service
of process are mistaken. Most importantly, a statutory right ought not serve
as a substitute for constitutional protection. Unless a defendant's right to
avoid having to defend in an inconvenient forum is recognized as one of
constitutional derivation, the right would be subject to repeal or revision at
any time by act of Congress.1 74 This is particularly important in the context
of litigation connected to a bankruptcy case where the statutory goal of
preserving assets of the debtor's estate is frequently paramount. 7 5
Second, if a motion for a change of venue was genuinely designed to
ensure that the defendant's constitutional rights were protected, it would
be inappropriate for such motions to be heard and finally determined by a
bankruptcy judge in a core proceeding. 76 Although withdrawal of the
172. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
173. See, e.g., Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138 (2d Cir. 1974); International Controls
Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974); Leasco Data
Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); see also FTC v. Jim
Walter Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 256 n. 8 (5th Cir. 1981) (questioning national contacts test in
light of Insurance Corp. of Ireland).
174. See Fullerton, supra note 6, at 36.
175. See Southwinds Assoc., Ltd. v. Reedy (In re Southwinds Assoc., Ltd), 115 Bankr.
857, 862 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990); Glassel v. Allegheny Int'l Credit Corp. (In re Allegheny
Int'l, Inc.), 111 Bankr. 495 (W.D. Pa. 1990); GEX Kentucky, Inc. v. Wolf Creek Collieries,
Co. (In re GEX Kentucky, Inc.), 85 Bankr. 431 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); F/S Airlease II,
Inc. v. Aerothrust Corp. (In re F/S Airlease II, Inc.), 67 Bankr. 428, 432 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1986); Foursquare Properties v. Akins Keyboard Sales, Inc. (In re Akins), 54 Bankr. 529
(Bankr. E.D. Wisc. 1985); Windso Communications Group, Inc. v. Five Towns Stationery,
Inc. (In re Windsor Communications Group, Inc.), 53 Bankr. 293, 296 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1985); Frazier v. Lawyers Title Ins. (In re Butcher), 46 Bankr. 109 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985);
Colarusso v. Burger King Corp., 35 Bankr. 365 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); Nixon Mach. Co. v.
Roy Energy, Inc. (In re Nixon Mach. Co.), 27 Bankr. 871, 873 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983);
Stamm v. Rapco Foam, Inc., 21 Bankr. 715 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982); Cole Assoc. v. Howes
Jewelers, Inc. (In re Cole Associates, Inc.), 7 Bankr. 154 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980); see also
Commonwealth v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. (In re Commonwealth Oil Refining Co.),
596 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980) (concerning venue of Chapter
11 case); In re Portjeff Dev. Corp., 118 Bankr. 184 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1990) (involving transfer
of venue of debtor's Chapter 11 case to district in which affiliate's case was pending in order
to promote efficient administration of two estates).
176. Bankruptcy judges may hear and finally determine all core proceedings arising under
the bankruptcy code and those arising in a bankruptcy case. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (1988).
A greater degree of participation by article III judges is required where constitutional
rights are at stake. See Currie, Bankruptcy Judges and the Independent Judiciary, 16 CREIGHTON
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reference to the bankruptcy judge might solve this particular problem,'"
resorting to the district court docket will slow the reorganization process
further. Motions for a change of venue are, however, treated as "matters
concerning the administration of the estate"'17 and, thus, are core proceed-
ings fully within the power of the bankruptcy judge to determine. 79 This
designation indicates that, at least in bankruptcy court, motions for a
change of venue are not designed to provide the defendant with protection
under the Fifth Amendment against undue governmental burdens.
Additionally, absent constitutional protection from being forced to
litigate in an inconvenient forum, a defendant would be unable to use the
procedurally powerful tactic of collateral attack and would instead be forced
to answer and defend if its motion for change of venue failed. 80 Moreover,
the defendant, as moving party, is saddled with the burden of proof in a
proceeding to obtain a change of venue.'
L. REv. 441, 465 (1983); Ferriell, supra note 154, at 131-32, 156-57; Redish, Legislative Courts,
Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 Duxa L.J. 197, 224-26,
229.
177. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (1988).
178. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(a) (1988).
179. E.g., Storage Equities, Inc. v. Delisle, 91 Bankr. 616 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (ruling that
motion to transfer venue of dischargeability action was core proceeding); In re Texaco, Inc.,
89 Bankr. 382 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (declaring change of venue motion in action to recover
royalty payments as core proceeding); In re Ofia Realty Corp., 74 Bankr. 574, 576 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1987); In re Waits, 70 Bankr. 591, 594 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); Mann v. Michael
Industries, Inc. (In re Inland Shoe Mfg. Co.), 90 Bankr. 981, 983 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988);
In re Oklahoma City Associates, 98 Bankr. 194 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding motion to
transfer bankruptcy case core); In re A & D Care Inc., 86 Bankr. 43, 45 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
1988) (same); In re Baltimore Food Systems, Inc., 71 Bankr. 795, 796 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1986)
(same).
There is some question as to whether bankruptcy courts are permitted to determine
change of venue motions brought in noncore civil disputes merely related to a bankruptcy
case. 28 U.S.C. § 1412 (1988), dealing with motions for change of venue, does not mention
civil proceedings arising in or related to a bankruptcy case. Instead, its language refers only
to cases or proceedings under the bankruptcy code. 28 U.S.C. § 1412 (1988). The absence of
any language in § 1412 referring to proceedings related to a bankruptcy case has led some
courts to suggest that motions for a chinge of venue of such a proceeding must be made
under the general federal change of venue provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1988). Compare
Goldberg Holding Corp. v. NEP Productions Inc., 93 Bankr. 33, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re
Retirement Inn At Forest Lane, Ltd., 83 Bankr. 795 (D. Utah 1988) with Storage Equities,
Inc. v. Delisle, 91 Bankr. 616 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (stating that motion to transfer venue of core
dischargeability action was core proceeding); In re Texaco, Inc., 89 Bankr. 382 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1988) (deciding that change of venue motion in action to recover royalty payments
was core proceeding). If motions for a change of venue are not properly characterized as core
proceedings, then the bankruptcy court would be limited to submitting proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law for de novo review by the district court. See In re Retirement Inn
At Forest Lane, Ltd., 83 Bankr. 795 (D. Utah 1988).
180. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 108-11 (1963); Fullerton, supra note 6, at 36.
181. See, e.g., In re Texaco, Inc., 89 Bankr. 382, 389 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re the
Willows Ltd., 87 Bankr. 684, 686 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1988) (citing In re Butcher, 46 Bankr.
109 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985)).
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Further, both statutory transfer of venue and forum non conveniens
are matters of judicial discretion18 2 not easily reversed on appeal. 1 3 The
standard of review in appeals of motions for a change of venue is the
"clearly erroneous" standard,'1 which is more difficult to satisfy than the
de novo standard used in appeals from motions to quash for lack of
personal jurisdiction.'85 Moreover, the statutory value placed on convenience
to the debtor and the importance in bankruptcy proceedings of preserving
estate assets invariably result in rulings in favor the debtor-in-possession or
trustee.'8 6 The difficulty of prevailing on appeal is particularly troublesome
given the unfavorable light in which bankruptcy judges sometimes view
motions for a change of venue.'87
Finally, rulings adverse to motions for transfer or dismissal are not
usually appealable until the conclusion of the underlying litigation.' Even
then, the trial judge's ruling on the motion for change of venue is subject
to an abuse of discretion standard of review, 89 rather than the de novo
standard that governs rulings on personal jurisdiction.' 90 Moreover, a de-
fendant who loses a motion for change of venue, and thus suffers the
burden of having to defend in a distant forum, is highly unlikely to appeal
from the adverse ruling after the inconvenient trial has been completed. For
these reasons, the opportunity for a change of venue is an inadequate
substitute for a Fifth Amendment challenge to the court's assertion of
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.
Another argument that has been advanced in support of nationwide
service of process provisions like Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d) is based upon
182. See, e.g., In re Texaco, Inc., 89 Bankr. 382, 387 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); McAllen,
supra note 48, at 193.
183. See Fullerton, supra note 6, at 37; Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241,
249-51 (1981).
184. E.g., Storage Equities, Inc. v. Delisle, 91 Bankr. 616, 617 (N.D. Ga. 1988).
185. E.g., Securities Investment Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir.
1985).
186. See 1 COLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 12, 3.02[4][c][ii], at 3-144 and the
authorities cited supra note 175.
187. E.g., Lipshie v. AM Cable TV Indus., Inc. (In re Geauga Trenching Corp.), 110
Bankr. 638, 649-650 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y 1990).
188. Pacor Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 988 (3d Cir. 1984); Nascone v. Spudnuts, Inc,
735 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Dalton, 733 F.2d 710, 714 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed,
469 U.S. 1185 (1985); In re Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co., 96 Bankr. 469 (Bankr. D. Del.
1989).
Subject to certain statutory exceptions not usually applicable to denials of motions to
transfer or dismiss due to forum non conveniens, federal appellate courts lack jurisdiction to
consider appeals until a final order has been issued. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988). See Fullerton,
supra note 6, at 37; 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 51, § 3855.
189. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981) (dismissing suit on
grounds of forum non conveniens because more convenient foreign forum was available);
Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 749-54 (1982).
190. E.g., Securities Investment Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir.
1985).
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the express language of article III of the Constitution, which provides that
the federal judicial power may be vested not only in the Supreme Court,
but also in "such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish."' 9'
Article III does not require Congress to establish inferior federal courts
at all. 92 Nor does it require that any inferior courts established by Congress
have jurisdictional limits that parallel state boundaries. 9 Therefore, the
boundaries of federal judicial districts might extend beyond the scope of
existing state lines.'94 It has been suggested that Congress might therefore
be permitted to establish only one federal district court which would be
able to exercise personal jurisdiction over all persons who have minimum
contacts with the United States or any portion of it.195
The validity of this negative implication arguably is supported by a
number of Supreme Court cases decided before the advent of modem due
process minimum contacts analysis. 96 Despite wide reliance on these cases
in support of nationwide service provisions,197 none of them holds that a
federal district court may assert jurisdiction over a defendant residing beyond
the borders of the state in which litigation is pending. 9 More recent lower
court opinions relying on this textual argument' 99 therefore make the mis-
takes not only of relying on outmoded dicta, but also of ignoring the
superseding effect of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 200
191. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
192. U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 1. See Johnson Creative Arts, Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc.,
743 F.2d 947, 950 (Ist Cir. 1984) (stating that 'minimum contacts' with a particular district
or state for purposes of personal jurisdiction is not a limitation imposed on the federal courts
in a federal question case by due process concerns. The Constitution does not require the
federal districts to follow state boundaries.") (citations omitted).
193. 4 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 51, at 324; Johnson Creative Arts,
Inc. v. Wool Masters, Inc., 743 F.2d 947, 950 (Ist Cir. 1984).
194. See, e.g., Green, Federal Jurisdiction In Personam of Corporations and Due Process,
14 VAND. L. REv. 967, 985-86 (1960-61).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569 (1878).
196. Mississippi PubI. Co. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 43 (1946); Robertson v. Railroad Labor
Bd., 268 U.S. 619 (1925); United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569 (1878); Toland v.
Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 729 (1838); Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609 (C.C. Mass. 1828)
(No. 11,134); Exparte Graham, 10 F. Cas. 911 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1818 (No. 5,657)). See Fullerton,
supra note 6, at 23-30. As noted by Professor Fullerton, Graham, Picquet, and Toland were
all decided prior to Pennoyer v. Neff. All but Mississippi Publ. Co. v. Murphree were decided
before International Shoe. Fullerton, supra note 6, at 30.
197. See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 694 F.2d 258, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Teitelbaum v.
Choquette & Co. (In re Outlet Dept. Stores, Inc.), 82 Bankr. 694, 697 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1988); Whitlock v. Worrall (In re American Aluminum Window Corp.), 15 Bankr. 803, 809
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1981); Fullerton, supra note 6, at 29.
198. Fullerton, supra note 6, at 29-30.
199. See, e.g., Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980).
200. See Fullerton, supra note 6, at 32.
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IV. NATIONWIDE SERVICE OF PROCESS IN A BANKRUPTCY CONTEXT:
RECONCILING THE FUFTH AMENDMENT WITH THE VALUES OF NATIONWIDE
SERVICE OF PROCESS IN BANKRUPTCY
A. Due Process and Rule 7004(d)
1. Minimum Contacts as Required: Aggregate Nationwide Contacts as a
Threshold Requirement
As indicated by the preceding discussion, a defendant's aggregate na-
tionwide contacts ought not, standing alone, be sufficient to permit a federal
bankruptcy court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant who
lacks contacts with the state or federal judicial district in which the adversary
proceeding is pending. The judicial code's venue rules for bankruptcy cases
and attendant litigation are far too heavily weighted in favor of the debtor's
choice of forum to adequately safeguard every defendant's Fifth Amendment
due process right of avoiding litigation in an unfairly burdensome location.
Despite this, territorial sovereignty still has a role to play in due process
analysis under the Fifth Amendment. Traditional minimum contacts anal-
ysis, of the type applied in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court2o
and World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson2°2 should be used to make
a threshold determination of whether the defendant is sufficiently within
the territorial sovereignty of the United States to permit any federal court
to exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. This analysis would be
similar to that conducted by the Supreme Court in part II A of Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Asahi.203 It would seek to establish whether the
defendant has established minimum contacts with the United States as a
whole by purposefully availing itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the United States.204 This threshold analysis would establish whether
the United States, as a sovereign state, has the power to assert jurisdiction
over the defendant consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
Although such an approach has never been propounded by the courts,
it would comport with the Supreme Court's decision in Asahi. It would
have the further advantage of incorporating the analysis of existing cases,
which treat the territorial sovereignty of the United States as an important
feature of Fifth Amendment analysis of nationwide service of process
statutes, into the Supreme Court's newfound emphasis on fairness to the
defendant.
As explained in a preceding section of this article2°5 the Supreme Court
in Asahi adopted a two-tiered approach, under the Fourteenth Amendment,
201. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
202. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
203. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
204. See id. at 103.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 107-12.
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when personal jurisdiction is asserted under a state long-arm statute. A
majority of the Court indicated that it would first inquire into whether the
defendant had established minimum contacts with the forum state by
purposefully availing itself of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum state by action purposefully directed toward the forum state.?
Although the justices disagreed in Asahi over the exact formulation and
application of this branch of personal jurisdiction analysis,2 an analysis of
whether the defendant had established minimum contacts with the forum
was clearly only the first step in the Court's analysis.
Similarly, when jurisdiction is asserted under a nationwide service of
process statute, like Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d), a court should first determine
whether the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the United
States to justify the judicial branch of the federal government in asserting
its sovereign power over the defendant. Most of the time this will present
no problem as the circumstances that gave rise to the claim asserted in the
action will be sufficient to establish the defendant's minimum contacts with
some part of the United States. Such contacts might not exist, however,
where a customer or supplier of a debtor has dealt only with foreign
subsidiaries or divisions of an otherwise domestic debtor.m
2. Fairness under the Fifth Amendment: Burdens on the Defendant and
the Governmental Interest in Nationwide Service
under Rule 7004(d)
a. Balancing Competing Interests
As in Asahi, after making this threshold determination of government
sovereignty, a court should then determine whether asserting personal juris-
206. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 111-12.
207. See generally Stewart, supra note 98 (discussing split among members of Court
regarding purposeful availment).
208. See Deak & Co. v. R.M.P. Soedjono (In re Deak & Co.), 63 Bankr. 422 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1986).
A similar problem may arise if a foreign entity deals with a foreign corporation which,
by virtue of assets located within the United States, is permitted to file a bankruptcy petition
under United States law. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1988).
Service upon a foreign defendant having minimum contacts with the United States would
have to be accomplished pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7004(e), which
provides:
(e) Service on debtor and others in foreign country. The summons and complaint
and all other process except a subpoena may be served as provided in Rule 4(d)(1)
and (d)(3) F.R.Civ.P. in a foreign country (A) on the debtor, any person required
to perform the duties of a debtor, any general partner of a partnership debtor, or
any attorney who is a party to a transaction subject to examination under Rule
2017; or (B) on any party to an adversary proceeding to determine or protect rights
in property in the custody of the court; or (C) on any person whenever such service
is authorized by a federal or state law referred to in Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(i) or (e)
F.R.Civ.P. [sic].
See Degnan & Kane, supra note 112; Dessem, Personal Jurisdiction after Asahi: The Other
(International) Shoe Drops, 55 TENN. L. REv. 41 (1987); Green, supra note 194; Note, Alien
Corporations and Aggregate Contacts: A Genuinely Federal Jurisdictional Standard, 95 HARv.
L. l-v. 470 (1981).
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diction over the defendant comports with the defendant's Fifth Amendment
due process right to avoid the imposition of unfair governmental burdens.m
As noted earlier, 10 the Court in Asahi examined five factors to determine
whether a particular assertion of personal jurisdiction over a geographically
distant defendant would comport with that defendant's due process rights.
Those factors are: "[1] the burden on the defendant, [2] the interests of
the forum State . .." [3] the interests of the plaintiff, [4] the interest of
'the interstate judicial system.., in obtaining the most efficient resolution
of the [controversy] combined with [5] the shared interest of the several
States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies."' 21'
Unlike the situation in Asahi, which was decided under the Fourteenth
Amendment, the latter two factors have no relevance in resolving questions
of fairness under the Fifth Amendment where there is no interstate judicial
system involved and where the competing interests of the several states are
not important. Further, despite the analysis of the Court in Asahi, it is
unclear why the plaintiff's interests should be taken into account separately
from whatever interest the federal government has in accommodating the
plaintiff's desires. As noted above, although consideration of the plaintiffs
interests may be appropriate to resolve a question of change of venue, they
seem irrelevant as an independent value when determining whether the
burden imposed on the defendant violates the defendant's constitutional
right to due process. The federal government may have an interest in
cooperating with the private goals of the plaintiff, but this interest should
be treated as part of the government's interest rather than as an independent
factor worthy of separate consideration.
Thus, instead of examining the five Asahi factors, the propriety of
nationwide service of process should depend on the burdens to be suffered
by the defendant and the interests of the federal government in asserting
personal jurisdiction in the particular forum chosen by the plaintiff. Proper
application of this test will depend on an understanding of the reasons and
policies in support of Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d), as well as the precise nature
of the burdens imposed on a defendant by having to answer and defend in
a specific case.
212
The remainder of this section will explain the nature of the government's
interest in nationwide service of process under Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d). It
will also describe how the various burdens imposed on a nonresident
defendant are to be analyzed against the backdrop of the interests and
policies supporting nationwide service under Rule 7004(d). The section that
209. See, e.g., Drobak, supra note 3; Gottlieb, supra note 98, at 1299; Kogan, supra note
20, at 367; Lewis, supra note 68, at 735-36; Redish, supra note 3.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 108-09 & 205.
211. 480 U.S. at 113 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
292 (1980)).
212. See Sinclair, Service of Process: Rethinking the Theory and Procedure of Serving
Process Under Federal Rule 4(c), 73 VA. L. REv. 1183, 1243 (1987); Note, Nationwide Personal
Jurisdiction, supra note 6, at 1124 n.34.
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follows will analyze how the governmental interest in nationwide service, in
bankruptcy cases,213 can be reconciled with a defendant's right to avoid
undue burdens in the context of a federal judicial system currently, but not
inevitably, tied to state boundaries.
21 4
b. Governmental Interests: Efficient Central Administration of Assets in
Bankruptcy
The primary policy in support of Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d) is the
efficiency of bankruptcy case administration that is obtained through the
ability to resolve all issues related to the debtor's circumstances in a single
forum. The Advisory Committee's Introductory Note to the Preliminary
Draft of the Bankruptcy Rules indicates that the nationwide service of
process provision of Rule 7004(d)'s predecessor, former Bankruptcy Rule
704(f)(1), 2 5 was intended "to achieve the advantages of a unitary organic
administration of each bankrupt estate to the extent compatible with fairness




Prior to adoption of Rule 704(f)(1) the territorial jurisdiction of a
bankruptcy court depended on whether the court was exercising its summary
or its plenary jurisdiction,2 7 and whether the underlying bankruptcy case
213. Cf. Stein, supra note 98 (supporting role of federalism and state sovereignty in
questions of state court jurisdiction).
214. See infra text accompanying notes 24453.
215. Current rule 7004(d) was based on former rule 704(f(1), which provided:
The summons, together with the complaint and notice of trial or pre-trial conference,
and all other process except a subpoena may be served anywhere within the United
States. "United States," as used in this subdivision includes the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico and the territories and possessions to which the Act is or may hereafter
be applicable.
FED. R. BANxR. P. 704(0(1) (repealed 1983).
216. Coamna ON Ruts OF PRACTiCE AND PRoCEDURE OF THE JUDIcIuL. CONFERENCE
OF TnE UnrED STATES, PRELImNARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED BArxaRrucy Ruts AND OmCA
FoRIs uNDER CHAPTERS I TO VII OF Tan BANKRUPTCY ACT xxxii (1971) [hereinafter PRELIM-
iNARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED BANKRirTrcy Rum.s].
217. See Gendel, Summary Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy Related to Possible Referee Dis-
qualification, 51 CALwn. L. Rnv. 755 (1963); MacLachlan, Scope of the Summary Jurisdiction
of the Bankruptcy Court, 40 CoLwr. L. REv. 489 (1940); Mussman & Riesenfeld, Jurisdiction
in Bankruptcy, 13 LAw & CoNrmi. PRODS. 88, 97-99 (1948).
Sections 77(a), 111, and 311 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended prior to its
1979 repeal, gave courts of bankruptcy jurisdiction over property of the debtor "wherever
located." E.g., Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 70a, 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1976) (repealed 1979). This
language was interpreted by the Supreme Court to permit a court of bankruptcy to extend its
process, for the purpose of protecting property within its power, beyond the territorial limits
of the bankruptcy court's authority. See Ex parte Baldwin, 291 U.S. 610 (1934); Continental
Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Rick Island Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 683-84 (1935); Mussman & Riesenfeld,
supra, at 98. Despite the Court's recognition that there was no reason for a different result
in summary proceedings in a liquidation case, lower federal courts routinely required disputes
over property located beyond the court's territorial boundaries to be prosecuted via ancillary
proceedings in the district in which the property was located. Id. at 98-99. In plenary
proceedings, on the other hand, jurisdiction could be obtained only over persons within the
territorial limits of the court in which the liquidation or reorganization case was pending. Id.
at 99.
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was a liquidation or a reorganization proceeding. 28 Although the complex
distinction between summary and plenary jurisdiction was unaffected by the
bankruptcy rules,2 9 the availability of nationwide service of process consti-
tuted an important stride toward simplifying the jurisdictional terrain in
bankruptcy cases. For the first time, bankruptcy matters within the court's
summary jurisdiction could at least be resolved in the same general geo-
graphic location, if not yet the same courtroom. Matters beyond the
bankruptcy judge's summary jurisdiction remained subject to whatever
territorial restraints applied to the district court's process generally.m
The drafters of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, acting shortly
after adoption of the original Bankruptcy Rules, 221 sought to enhance the
efficiency of bankruptcy administration by consolidating all litigation related
to a bankruptcy case in a single forum. The inefficiencies and delays caused
by the archaic distinction in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, between summary
and plenary jurisdiction, 2 2 caused extensive delays and considerable expense
that both disrupted the bankruptcy process and also drained assets from
the estate that might otherwise have been used to satisfy the claims of
creditors or rehabilitate the debtor. Thus, the jurisdictional provisions of
218. See Mussman & Riesenfeld, supra note 217, at 98-99.
219. The distinction between summary and plenary proceedings was a difficult one. See
generally REPORT OF THE Comm'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., part 1, at 89-91 (1973) [hereinafter COmam'N REPORT, pt.
1]; Hollins, Summary Jurisdiction of Referees, 14 J. NAT'L A. REF. iN BANKR. 17 (1939);
Ross, Federal Jurisdiction in Suits by Trustees in Bankruptcy, 20 IowA L. REv. 565 (1935).
Its complexities led the drafters of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 to propose a less
cumbersome jurisdictional structure for bankruptcy courts as part of that legislation's overhaul
of the bankruptcy system. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 43-48 (1977)
[hereinafter 1977 HousE REPORT], reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmiN. NEws 5963,
6004-09; S. REP. No. 9899, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 SENATE REPORT],
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ArmiN. NEWS 5787, 5803. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court's 1982 decision in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50, modified per curiam, 459 U.S. 813 (1982), declared much of the new and simpler bankruptcy
court structure unconstitutional.
Summary proceedings were those conducted by the bankruptcy court in matters relating
to estate administration and in proceedings dealing with estate property in the court's possession,
or, in the absence of such possession, when the adverse claimant had given consent to the
summary jurisdiction of the court. See generally 2 COLIER ON BANKRurPTcY 23.02[1] (L.
King 14th ed. 1976). Plenary proceedings were conducted by the district court, sitting as a
court of bankruptcy or as a district court, over actions brought by the trustee against parties,
other than the debtor, who had not consented to the bankruptcy court's authority, and where
the property involved in the dispute was not in the actual or constructive possession of the
court. See generally id.
220. Sarf v. Arnovitz, 19 Bankr. 78 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Continental Mortgage
Investors, 465 F. Supp. 614, 617 (D. Mass. 1979).
221. The original Bankruptcy Rules were finally officially promulgated in 1973. See
Landers, supra note 46, at 827. At approximately the same time, the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, formed in 1970, issued its report. See Klee, Legislative
History of the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 275, 277 (1980).
222. See note 219, supra.
223. CoMM'N REPORT, pt. 1, supra note 219, at 89-90. See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S.
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the Bankruptcy Reform Act gave original jurisdiction to bankruptcy judges
to finally determine "all civil proceedings arising under [the bankruptcy
code] or arising in or related to cases under [the bankruptcy code]."27
The purpose of this broad grant of jurisdiction was to ensure that any
litigation arising in the course of a bankruptcy case was to be conducted
before a bankruptcy judge instead of in federal district court or in a state
court.2 25 The advantages of this system over the regime under the Bankruptcy
Act were obvious. The court in which a bankruptcy case had been filed
had original jurisdiction over all types and categories of litigation affecting
the bankrupt debtor or the estate. Disputes even remotely connected to a
bankruptcy case could be resolved on the relatively efficient bankruptcy
court docket before a judge already familiar with the underlying bankruptcy
case, without resort to the more deliberate docket of a nearby state court
or a district court. Further, except for disputes involving negligible sums'
and those arising after the commencement of the case, 27 venue of all such
litigation was proper in the bankruptcy court in which the underlying
bankruptcy case was pending.228 Thus, with few exceptions, all bankruptcy
litigation could be conducted before the same court.
Unfortunately, this broad grant of jurisdiction violated the doctrine of
separation of powers. In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co. 9 the Supreme Court held that bankruptcy judges, who
lacked the lifetime appointment and undiminishable salary protection pro-
vided for in article III of the Constitution, could not finally determine a
dispute between a Chapter 11 debtor and one of its customers arising from
a simple state-law based contract claim. 230 District judges, accorded the
undiminishable salary and good-behavior appointments required by article
III of the Constitution, could have heard the dispute,uI but untenured
323, 328 (1966) (noting congressional policy of prompt and efficient administration of bank-
rupts' estates effectuated by prompt resolution of attendant litigation).
224. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 241(a), 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmuN. NEws (92 Stat.) 2549, 2668 (originally codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1471) (repealed
1984).
225. 1977 HousE REPoRT, supra note 219, at 7-23, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADxm. NEws 5963, 5968-84; In re Bell & Beckwith, 41 Bankr. 697, 699 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1984); In re Schack Glass Indus., Co., 20 Bankr. 967 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re G. Weeks
Sec., Inc., 3 Bankr. 215 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1980).
226. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 241(a), 1978 U.S. CODE
CoNG. & Anian. NEws (92 Stat.) 2549, 2668 (originally codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1473(b))
(repealed 1984).
227. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 241(a), 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AnisN. NEws (92 Stat.) 2549, 2668 (originally codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1473(d), (e))
(repealed 1984).
228. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 241(a), 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & Anmw. NEws (92 Stat.) 2549, 2668 (originally codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1473(a))
(repealed 1984).
229. 458 U.S. 50, modified per curiam 459 U.S. 813 (1982).
230. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 & n.40,
90-91, modified per curiam, 459 U.S. 813 (1982).
231. Id. at 73, n.26.
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bankruptcy judges could not. Congress had not included a severability
provision in the jurisdictional provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
and, thus, the Court ruled that the entire jurisdictional grant regarding
bankruptcy matters was unconstitutional.
23 2
When Congress finally addressed the crisis in the bankruptcy system
that had been created by Marathon,233 the revised jurisdictional structure it
created necessarily lacked many of the efficiencies originally incorporated
in the Bankruptcy Reform Act. Instead of vesting jurisdiction in bankruptcy
judges, Congress gave authority to hear bankruptcy cases, and litigation
arising in the course of such cases, to the district courts.234 The district
courts, in turn, are permitted to refer bankruptcy cases and civil proceedings
arising under the bankruptcy code or arising in or related to a bankruptcy
case, to a bankruptcy judge for the district in which the case was pending.?15
232. Id. at 87-88 n.40 (Brennan, J.), 91 (Rehnquist, J. concurring).
At the time, it seemed that it would be impossible for bankruptcy courts, or district
courts for that matter, to exercise any jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters, except as might
be permitted under the general federal question and diversity statutes. The Court therefore
took the unusual step of staying the effect of its decision until Oct. 4, 1982, to give Congress
time to resolve the matter. Id. at 88-89. The Court subsequently extended its stay until midnight
Dec. 24, 1982, 459 U.S. 813 (1982), at which time the stay was permitted to expire. 459 U.S.
1094 (1982).
233. In immediate response to the crisis, the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts issued an interim Emergency Rule for use by district courts to avoid the burden that
otherwise would be placed on their dockets by having to resolve all matters pending or brought
in bankruptcy court. See Memorandum from William E. Foley, Director, Administrative Office
of the United States Courts, to the judges of the U.S. courts of Appeal, District Courts,
Bankruptcy Courts, and the clerks of the Bankruptcy Courts (Sept. 27, 1982), reprinted in I
CoLaE ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 12, 1 3.01[1][b][vi] [hereinafter Emergency Rule].
The drafters of the Emergency Rule assumed, perhaps incorrectly, that Northern Pipeline
had not affected the validity of then judicial code sections 1471(a) and (b). See Countryman,
Emergency Rule Compounds the Emergency, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 6-9 (1983); Countryman,
Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The Chief Justice, The Judicial Conference,
and the Legislative Process, 22 HAzv. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 19-28 (1985); Vihon, Delegation of
Authority and The Model Rule: The Continuing Saga of Northern Pipeline, 88 CoM. L.J. 66-
76 (1983); Chatz & Tatelbaum, Conference Report: Bankruptcy Courts and the Emergency
Rule, 88 CoM. L.J. 61 (1983); Weisbart, A Practical Look at the Interim Rule, 88 Com. L.J.
371, 377 (1983); King, The Unmaking of a Bankruptcy Court: Aftermath of Northern Pipeline
v. Marathon, 40 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 99, 116-17 (1983). Some bankruptcy judges held the
Emergency Rule invalid. See In re Wildman, 10 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 668 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1983); In re Johnson County Gas Co., 10 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 885 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1983).
The Emergency Rule proposed that bankruptcy cases and civil proceedings connected to
bankruptcy cases be referred to the bankruptcy judges of the district in question. Emergency
Rule § (c)(1), supra. The Rule permitted the district court to withdraw any part of a case or
civil proceeding and also permitted de novo review by the district court of any ruling objected
to by a party in interest. Id. § (e)(2)(B). See generally Ferriell, supra note 154, at 118-19.
Congress did not settle on a resolution of the problem until July 10, 1984. See Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship. Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 11 U.S.C., & 28 U.S.C.) [hereinafter BAFJA]. The provisions
of BAFJA relevant to this article are contained in Title I, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333,
333-46 (1984).
234. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), (b) (1988).
235. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1988).
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Bankruptcy judges have power to enter final orders, however, only in
"core proceedings" arising under the bankruptcy code or arising in a case
under the bankruptcy code.? 6 Civil proceedings merely "related to" a
bankruptcy case, like the one involved in Marathon Pipe Line, can be
heard, but not finally decided by a bankruptcy judge.2 7 In these non-core
proceedings the bankruptcy judge can submit only proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law for de novo review by the district court.235 Further,
the district court is, of course, permitted, and in some cases required, to
withdraw its reference of a dispute from the bankruptcy court for resolution
on the district court's docket.2 9 Finally, the district court's authority over
civil proceedings is specifically subject to both permissive and mandatory
abstention rules in many cases involving questions of state law that can be
resolved in a timely fashion in state court.M
The complexities of the current system, although perhaps mandated by
Marathon and political realities, 2A1 detract considerably from one of the
central goals of the original Bankruptcy Reform Act, that of streamlining
bankruptcy case administration. u 2 However, the existing jurisdictional re-
gime was established to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution, without
giving bankruptcy judges article III powers, not to further the goal of
efficient case administration. Nevertheless, efficient estate administration
remains as the most important purpose behind Rule 7004(d).2 3
c. Burdens on the Defendant-Litigation in a Distant Forum
If fairness toward the defendant is a legitimate Fifth Amendment
concern, as it must certainly be, then the government's legitimate interest
236. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (1988).
237. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1988).
238. Id.
239. 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (1988).
240. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c) (1988). See generally Ferriell, supra note 154, at 182-84.
241. See Downey, Ferriell, & Pfeiffer, supra note 159, at 569-71.
242. The jurisdictional structure established by the Bankruptcy Reform Act and struck
down by Marathon were not the only features of the Code designed to promote this goal.
Others, such as establishing the United States Trustee's office to take over many of the
administrative chores previously handled by bankruptcy judges, remain in effect. See 1 Cousara
ON BAxRuprcy, supra note 12, 6.02[3].
243. See, e.g., Beasley v. Kelco Foods, Inc. (In re Trim-Lean Meat Prod., Inc.), 11
Bankr. 1010 (Bankr. D. Del. 1981) (citing efficient administration of estate assets as purpose
for former Rule 704(f)(1)).
The court's reliance on the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, as a means
of interpreting former Rule 704(f)(1), was seriously misplaced. Rule 704(f)(1) was promulgated
prior to the Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States upon
which the court so heavily depended for its analysis. Rule 704(f)(1) was adopted on October
1, 1973, while the Bankruptcy Commission's Report was transmitted a few months earlier, on
July 30, 1973. The first official draft of the rules containing the nationwide service of process
provision was submitted by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference in March, 1971. See, Landers, supra note 46, at 827. The Trim-Lean Meat Prods.
decision nevertheless reflects the relationship between the nationwide service of process rule
and the policy of promoting the efficient administration of estate assets.
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in the efficient administration of bankruptcy cases must be measured against
the burdens on the defendant from having to defend in a geographically
distant and inconvenient forum in order to evaluate the constitutionality of
any particular application of Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d).
The burdens suffered by a defendant, on account of having to litigate
in a forum away from home, will depend to some extent on the sheer
distance between the defendant's location and the forum. While modern
forms of transportation and communication have made cross-country liti-
gation possible, they have not totally dissipated its burdens. 24 Meal, travel,
and lodging expenses will be incurred for parties, witnesses, attorneys, and
staff for court appearances, discovery, and consultations with local coun-
sel. 5 Although testimony of otherwise unavailable witnesses may be made
available via videotape,2" this frozen version of the witnesses' evidence is a
poor substitute for live testimony.247 Further, documents and exhibits will
have to be transported and provision made for their care while in a distant
location.m Additionally, agents and officers of the defendant will incur
intangible expenses of stress and missed business opportunities249 associated
with being away from home.
Further, local counsel, although experienced in the customs of the
forum court, may be less responsive and attentive to the needs of the
defendant. Because of the defendant's lack of contacts with the forum state,
the defendant will be unlikely to become a regular client of the local firm
retained to conduct the litigation, and equally unlikely to refer the firm to
other prospective local clients. 250
This latter burden suggests that the defendant's opportunity for a full
and fair litigation of the dispute may be adversely affected by the need to
rely on local counsel.2-' Even where local counsel is diligent, the additional
244. Fullerton, supra note 6, at 41; Wasserman, supra note 64, at 112-17.
245. See National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 326 (1964) (Black, J.,
dissenting); Fullerton, supra note 6, at 41; Gottlieb, supra note 98, at 1325; Note, Fifth
Amendment Limitations, supra note 6.
Most jurisdictions require that locally admitted counsel participate in litigation conducted
in a state forum. Note, The Practice of Law by Out-of-State Attorneys, 20 VAN. L. Ra,.
1276 (1967). Furthermore, the custom among lawyers for the receiving attorney to forward
one-third of the fee to the referring lawyer is likely to result in increased costs to a defendant
forced to rely on a referral to counsel in the forum state. See Schwartz & Mitchell, An
Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. Ray.
1125 (1970); but see Note, Division of Fees Between Attorneys 3 J. LEGAL PROF. 179, 194-96
(1978).
246. Wasserman, supra note 64, at 41.
247. Id.
248. Fullerton, supra note 6, at 41.
249. Id.
250. G. BEu.ow & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYEmiNG PROCESS 35-123 (1978); Gottlieb, supra
note 98, at 1325.
251. Lopucki & Whitford, supra note 22, at 38-40; Gibson, supra note 43; cf. Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971) (stating that denial of defendant's full access to judicial
process raises grave problems for its legitimacy).
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expenses of litigating in a distant forum may drain resources from the
defendant that might otherwise have been used more directly in the pres-




These burdens-the additional direct costs of litigating in a distant
forum, and the increased risk of an incorrect decision due to the allocation
of resources away from the collection and presentation of evidence to the
trier of fact-must be outweighed by the governmental interest in ensuring
efficient bankruptcy case administration by litigating the dispute in a single
forum in order to justify conducting the litigation in a forum with which
the defendant has no contact. As the next section will more fully explain,
some courts have suggested that these competing interests can be appropri-
ately balanced in a proceeding to transfer venue of the action to another
district.
Another important burden, associated with having to defend in a forum
with which the defendant lacks meaningful contact, is the risk that the
forum court will apply the law of its own jurisdiction. Although not yet
fully recognized by the Supreme Court, the relationship between decisions
about personal jurisdiction and choice of law has been noted by other
scholars.253
d. Transfer of Venue and Forum Non Conveniens
As suggested in an earlier section, bankruptcy courts have responded
to charges that Rule 7004(d) may be unconstitutionally applied by indicating
that the opportunity of a change of venue of the civil dispute provides a
defendant with all of the protection it is due against having to litigate in
an unfairly burdensome forum. As discussed earlier, however, such decisions
fail to adequately consider the limitations inherent in any statutory or
252. See Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration,
2 J. LEG. STrunms 399 (1973).
One of the salient effects of this use of resources is an increase in what scholars who
analyze law from an economic perspective call "error costs." Error costs are defined by Posner
as "the social costs generated when a judicial system fails to carry out the allocative or other
social functions assigned to it .... ." Id. at 400. To the extent that a distant trial makes one
party more likely than another to bear the risks of such errors, due to the increased expenses
and other difficulties of proof in a distant forum, these errors are "biased" against that party.
See id. at 406-08. A biased increase in the likelihood of an incorrect imposition of liability,
resulting from having to defend in an inconvenient forum is the type of burden that the Fifth
Amendment might seek to avoid.
253. See Hill, Choice of Law and Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, 81 COLuM. L. Rv.
960 (1981); Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. Rnv. 872 (1980) ;
Sedler, Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: The Consequences of Shaffer v. Heitner, 63
IowA L. Rav. 1031 (1978); Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L..
Rav. 33, 87-89 (1978); Stein, supra note 98, at 738-65; Cox, The Interrelationship of Personal
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Forging New Theory Through Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v.
Superior Court, 49 U. Prrr. L. Ra,. 189, 190 n.1, 222-27 (1987); see also Peterson, Jurisdiction
and Choice of Law Revisited, 59 U. CoLo. L. REv. 37, 52 (1988) (stating that "Asahi reinforces
and expands the proposition that choice of law and the exercise of judicial jurisdiction are
relevant to one another").
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equitable right to request a transfer of venue that do not adequately consider
a defendant's constitutional right to due process.
Bankruptcy Rule 7087 and section 1412 of the Judicial Code govern
transfer of venue in adversary proceedings in bankruptcy cases. Rule 7087
provides that "loin motion and after a hearing, the court may transfer an
adversary proceeding or any part thereof to another district pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1412. ... ,,21 Section 1412, in turn, provides for transfer of a
"case or proceeding under title 11 to a district court for another district,
in the interest of justice or for the convenience of the parties."' ' 55
Similarly, the equitable doctrine of forum non conveniens may permit
a bankruptcy judge to dismiss a case brought in an inconvenient forum."2 6
Forum non conveniens is an alternative avenue for protecting a defendant
from an overly burdensome forum. 257 The doctrine permits a court to
dismiss a case on the ground that another forum is better suited to entertain
an action even though venue is proper and the court has jurisdiction over
the case and the parties. 218 Although bankruptcy courts are courts of
equity,219 they do not normally dismiss actions brought in a proper venue
under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, except in cases in which a
more convenient forum might be found in another country.m
254. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7087.
255. 28 U.S.C. § 1412 (1988).
At first blush, Rule 7087 appears to provide protection against an inconvenient forum
only in a very narrow range of cases. The language of Rule 7087 applies to all "adversary
proceedings," which would include, among other things, a proceeding "to recover money or
property ... [or] to obtain an injunction or other equitable relief .... " FED. R. BANR. P.
7001 (defining "adversary proceeding"). However, the language of section 1412, upon which
rule 7087 depends, only permits the court to transfer venue in a case or proceeding "under
Title 11." 28 U.S.C. § 1412 (1988). If the ability of the court to transfer venue of an adversary
proceeding under Rule 7087.is limited to adversary proceedings under Title 11, venue could
be transferred pursuant to Rule 7087 only in adversary proceedings involving a cause of action
brought directly under one of the substantive provisions of the bankruptcy code.
Limiting transfer of venue in this way would, however, be undesirable. By permitting
change of venue only in cases arising under the Bankruptcy Code, such a limitation would
permit transfer only in those adversary proceedings most directly connected to the substantive
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Actions arising under state law, perhaps only tangentially
related to the underlying bankruptcy cases, would not be subject to transfer. Thus, this limited
reading of section 1412 and Rule 7087 would permit transfer in cases most directly related to
the policy of efficient estate administration and preclude transfer in cases more remotely
connected with this purpose. In any event, a court could undoubtedly dismiss an adversary
proceeding under the doctrine of forum non conveniens if change of venue was limited by the
technical language of these provisions.
256. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
257. See Comment, Forum Non Conveniens, A New Federal Doctrine, 56 YALE L.J. 1234
(1947).
258. See McAllen, supra note 48, at 192-93.
259. See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304
(1939); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934); Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,
492 U.S. 33, 57-58 (1989); Gibson, Jury Trials in Bankruptcy: Obeying the Commands of
Article III and the Seventh Amendment, 72 MiNN. L. Ra,. 967 (1988).
260. See Baumgart v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp. (In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp), 4 Tex.
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The standards that govern transfer of venue of proceedings under section
1412 and Rule 7087 fail to adequately take a defendant's Fifth Amendment
rights into account. Although some courts sometimes confuse the standards
for transferring venue of an entire bankruptcy case with those relevant to
transferring venue of an individual adversary proceeding arising in the
course of a bankruptcy case, 261 the factors frequently considered in applying
Rule 7087 are: (1) the proximity of witnesses to the court; (2) the proximity
of assets and creditors to the court; (3) the economics involved in the
administration of the proceeding; (4) the relative ease of access to sources
of proof; (5) the ease of obtaining unwilling witnesses, or availability of a
compulsory process to require attendance of unwilling witnesses; (6) the
enforceability of the judgment; (7) the state's interest in having local
controversies resolved within state borders when that state's laws are being
applied in the action; and (8) all other practical problems that make trial
of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.
2 62
Consideration of some of these factors, such as the proximity of
creditors and estate assets to the court, seems inappropriate to the question
of whether to transfer venue of an adversary proceeding.263 While such
factors are significant in determining whether the entire bankruptcy case
should be transferred, the location of creditors of the estate bears no logical
connection to the most convenient forum for a civil proceeding arising out
of the bankruptcy case. Similarly, the proximity of the debtor's assets to
the forum court should be ignored in determining whether venue of a civil
proceeding should be transferred to another district.
Apart from these general factors, courts are heavily influenced by the
general bankruptcy policy of promoting the economic and efficient admin-
Bankr. Ct. Rep. 308, 1990 WL 119650 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (WESTLAW, Fbkr-cs
database); Refco F/S Assoc. v. Mebco Bank, S.A., 108 Bankr. 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Liman v.
Midland Bank, Ltd, 309 F.Supp. 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
261. Compare, e.g., GEX Kentucky, Inc. v. Wolf Creek Collieries Co. (In re GEX
Kentucky, Inc.) 85 Bankr. 431 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (transfer of adversary proceeding)
and Frazier v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. (In re Butcher), 46 Bankr. 109 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1985) (adversary proceeding) with In re Pope Vineyards, 90 Bankr. 252, 255 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1988) (transfer of bankruptcy case) and In re Willows Ltd, 87 Bankr. 684, 686 (Bankr.
S.D. Ala 1988) (transfer of bankruptcy case). See generally Young Properties Corp. v. United
Equity Corp. 394 F. Supp. 1243 (S.D. Cal. 1975), appeal dismissed 534 F.2d 847 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976) (regarding difference between motion to transfer and adversary
proceeding and motion to transfer entire bankruptcy case).
262. These factors were derived from In re Commonwealth Refining Co., Inc., 596 F.2d
1239 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980), a case dealing with the transfer of a
bankruptcy case, not a civil proceeding arising in or related to such a case. They have been
applied extensively in cases under Rule 7087. See, e.g., Mann v. Michael Industries, Inc. (In
re Inland Shoe Mfg. Co.), 90 Bankr. 981, 983-84 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988); GEX Kentucky,
Inc. v. Wolf Creek Collieries Co. (In re GEX Kentucky, Inc.), 85 Bankr. 431 (N.D. Ohio
1987); Frazier v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. (In re Butcher), 46 Bankr. 109 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1985); see also Beaulieu v. Amatex Corp., 28 Bankr. 171, 174 (Bankr. D. Maine 1983)
(providing more extensive list of factors to be used in determining motions for change of
venue).
263. E.g., Kotlicky v. Belford, 64 Bankr. 679 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986).
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istration of the bankruptcy estate. This general policy has resulted in a
presumption that adversary proceedings should be conducted in the same
court in which the bankruptcy case itself is pending.
2"
On the other hand, change of venue provisions occasionally have been
used to provide relief to defendants who failed to make an objection on
constitutional grounds. In Wander v. Steinhardt Partners (In re Sheridan
Associates),265 a bankruptcy trustee brought suit in the district in which the
bankruptcy case was pending to recover an alleged preference. 26 The de-
fendant, who lacked contact with the forum in which the adversary pro-
ceeding was filed, moved for a change of venue and used its lack of
minimum contacts with the forum-not to challenge the constitutionality of
Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d)-but instead as grounds for a change of venue
under the predecessor to section 1412.267 The court conducted a careful
inquiry into the proof involved in an action to recover a preference, 2" and
determined that the largest number of potential witnesses were located in
New York, beyond the subpoena power of the bankruptcy court for the
Northern District of Illinois where the action had been brought.
269
Cases like Wander in which important witnesses are beyond the court's
subpoena power270 present the strongest case for the efficacy of rules
264. See Brock v. American Messenger Service, 65 Bankr. 670 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986);
GEX Kentucky, Inc. v. Wolf Creed Collieries, Co. (In re GEX Kentucky, Inc.), 85 Bankr.
431, 435 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); Windsor Communications Group v. Five Towns Stationary,
Inc. (In re Windsor Communications Group, Inc.), 53 Bankr. 293, 296 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1985); Seybolt v. Bio-Energy of Lincoln, Inc., 38 Bankr. 123, 10 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d (MB)
1124 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984); Colarusso v. Burger King Corp., 35 Bankr. 365 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1984); Nixon Mach. Co. v. Roy Energy, Inc. (In re Nixon Mach. Co.), 27 Bankr. 871
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983); National Sugar Refining Co. v. Lentz Milling Co. (In re National
Sugar Refining Co.), 26 Bankr. 762 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); Stamm v. Rapco Foam, Inc. (In
re Stamm), 21 Bankr. 715 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982).
265. 20 Bankr. 759 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982).
266. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1986). An action to recover a preference is characterized as
a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(F) (1986).
267. Wander v. Steinhardt & Partners (In re Sheridan Assoc.), 20 Bankr. 759, 760, 765
(Bankr. N.D. 11. 1982).
Section 1412 is based on former 28 U.S.C. § 1475, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549,
2670, § 241(a) (repealed 1984). Section 1475 was identical to current 28 U.S.C. § 1412 (1988).
Section 1475 was, in turn, based on former Bankruptcy Rules 117 and 782. See H.R. Rep.
95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 447, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG & ADmiN. NEws 5963,
6403.
268. 20 Bankr. at 762. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
269. 20 Bankr. at 764.
The subpoena power of a bankruptcy court is limited by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 7004(d), which does not permit nationwide service of a subpoena. FED. R. BA.NK.
P. 7004(d). Subpoenas are governed by Bankruptcy Rule 9016 which simply incorporates by
reference Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure into the Bankruptcy Rules. FED. R.
BANKR. P. 9016. As indicated by the Advisory Committee Note to Bankruptcy Rule 9016,
Federal Rule 45(e)(1) limits the subpoena power to the judicial district in which the action is
pending and to places outside the district which are within 100 miles of the place of trial.
FED. R. Civ. P. 45(e)(1).
270. It should be noted here that limits imposed on the subpoena power are purely
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regarding change of venue in addressing the burdens imposed on a distant
defendant. There are, however, few reported decisions granting a change
of venue in adversary proceedings in bankruptcy court.27' The paucity of
such decisions suggests that few defendants are successful in advancing their
attempts to avoid litigating in a burdensome forum via a motion for change
of venue.
B. A Due Process-Minimum Contacts Test for Personal Jurisdiction in
Bankruptcy Litigation
The fairness concern of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments requires that parties not be required to defend a
suit in a jurisdiction related to neither the defendant nor the dispute.2 2 The
foregoing analysis demonstrates that the law relating to nationwide service
of process statutes pays insufficient attention to the degree of procedural
fairness provided to geographically distant defendants who lack contacts
with the forum to which they have been haled. The immediately preceding
section shows how existing bankruptcy venue rules exacerbate the potential
for unfairness to a defendant because of their solicitousness toward the
desires of the debtor in possession or trustee in the name of efficient case
administration. Although these dangers might be mitigated by adjustments
in the venue rules applicable to bankruptcy litigation, greater protection for
the defendant would be achieved through a recognition of some sort of
fairness test for use, not only in bankruptcy cases, but in all cases where
nationwide service of process seems otherwise desirable.
The due process test we are accustomed to, of course, is the minimum
contacts standard of International Shoe and its progeny. A state may assert
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if the defendant has
continuous and systematic contacts with the forum, or if the defendant's
sporadic contacts with the forum gave rise to the cause of action involved
in the dispute. 273 As we have seen, most courts apply a similar test in
nationwide service of process cases, seeking to determine not whether the
assertion of jurisdiction is fair to the defendant, but simply whether the
defendant has contacts with the United States or any part of it. This article
has demonstrated the inadequacy of this simple sovereignty approach if
procedural fairness to a geographically distant defendant is to have any real
meaning.
One alternative would be simply to borrow the minimum contacts
analysis used in cases in state court under the Fourteenth Amendment's
statutory. The legion of cases which permit bankruptcy and other federal courts to exercise
personal jurisdiction over a geographically distant defendant could also be used to support the
constitutionality of a rule permitting nationwide service of subpoenas.
271. E.g., Lipshie v. AM Cable TV Industries, Inc. (In re Geauga Trenching Corp.), 110
Bankr. 638 (Bankr. E.D. New York 1990).
272. See Cox, supra note 253, at 288-91.
273. See generally J. FgwDENTmrm, M. KAte, & A. MUIR, CvnM PROCEDtURE 123-39
(1985).
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Due Process Clause and apply it directly to cases involving personal juis-
diction under the Fifth Amendment. This would have the relative advantages
of applying a well developed, albeit sometimes ambiguous, set of rules
already recognized by the legal community. The minimum contacts doctrine,
however, has its roots in our federalist system which, at one time at least,
recognized real limitations on the sovereign power of its units to exercise
jurisdiction over nonresident individuals.274 It is not well suited to use by a
federal judicial system that has true sovereign power over all of its residents,
except as limited by the due process concerns of the Fifth Amendment.
A second alternative would be the adoption of a simple fairness test,
somewhat akin to that used in determining whether to transfer venue, but
with a greater emphasis on protecting the defendant from unfair burdens
and less concerned with administrative efficiency. Such a test would compare
the interests of the federal government in the efficiency of bankruptcy estate
administration with the burdens placed on the defendant to determine
whether asserting personal jurisdiction over the defendant comports with
the fairness component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
This was the type of test adopted in the leading case imposing mean-
ingful due process limitations on a federal court's power to exercise personal
jurisdiction under a nationwide service of process statute, Oxford First
Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp.275 There, an action was brought in federal
district court in Philadelphia, alleging that shareholders located in California
had violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and of
section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.276 In response to the defendant's
motion to dismiss due to a lack of personal jurisdiction, the court first
acknowledged that the Due Process Clause imposes some limits on federal
service of process. 277 The court then applied a five-part fairness test to
determine whether a federal court's assertion of personal jurisdiction com-
ported with these limitations. 278
The first part of the court's test examined "the extent of the defendant's
contacts with the place where the action was brought .... "279 In the case
in question the defendants had disseminated allegedly false and misleading
financial statements that they knew would be used by the plaintiff in
Philadelphia.nO The court further determined that the defendants had re-
ceived benefits from the plaintiff as a result of negotiations conducted in
Philadelphia. 281
274. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); 4 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PRocEDuRE, supra
note 51, at 294.
275. 372 F. Supp. 191, 198-205 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
276. Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 192 n.l (E.D. Pa.
1974).
277. Id. at 198-99.
278. Id. at 203-05.
279. Id. at 203.
280. Id. at 204.
281. Id.
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The second part of the court's test examined the "inconvenience to the
defendants from having to defend in a jurisdiction other than that of [its]
residence or place of business." The court acknowledged that this criterion
weighed against jurisdiction because of the geographic distance between
California and Pennsylvania.23
The third element was judicial economy, including the likelihood and
the extent of an adverse impact on the litigation as a result of having a
part of the action dismissed, and the costs associated with the duplication
of efforts caused by having to conduct two parts of a lawsuit simultaneously
in different judicial districts.2 In Oxford First this factor was significant
in that some defendants were located in California and others in Pennsyl-
vania. Dismissal of the action against the California defendants would have
resulted in an otherwise unnecessary and costly bifurcation of the action.83
The fourth part of the court's fairness test, "probable situs of discovery
proceedings,' 6 mitigated in favor of conducting the litigation in Philadel-
phia where most of the discovery would be likely to occur, regardless of
where the actual trial took place.2-7
The fifth element, deemed irrelevant on the particular facts of Oxford
First, was the nature of the activity of the defendant and the extent of its
impact beyond the borders of the defendant's state. 218
This straightforward balancing test would be simple to articulate and,
in all but the most troubling cases, easy to apply. Ignoring state and district
boundaries, however, would conflict with the traditions associated with
assertions of personal jurisdiction, and, in an unusual case, might prevent
personal jurisdiction from being asserted over a defendant located in the
same state as the district in which the litigation is pending. 2 9 A defendant
would undoubtedly be subject to personal jurisdiction in a state court action
brought in the defendant's home state29° and, therefore, should also be
subject to personal jurisdiction in a federal court located in his or her home
state. There is no doubt, however, that the factors used by the Oxford First
court will be relevant in any sort of fairness test employed under the Fifth
Amendment.
282. Id. at 203.
283. Id. at 205.
284. Id. at 203.
285. Id. at 205.
286. Id. at 203.
287. Id. at 205.
288. Id. at 204-05.
289. A defendant in Yreka, California, located in the extreme northern portion of
California, for example, might experience severe financial or personal burdens to appear and
defend a lawsuit pending in United States Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of
California, located in San Diego. See 4 FDEAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 51, §
1067.1, at 327.
290. However unlikely it seems that a court would ever rule against an assertion of
personal jurisdiction over a defendant clearly located in the forum state, such a result is
theoretically possible under an analysis which merely balances the competing interests of the
state and the individual defendant.
1991] 1249
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:1199
A third alternative, proposed by this article, would establish a set of
rebuttable presumptions based on state boundaries and the defendant's
contacts with the state in which the forum district is located.
Defendants who neither reside in the forum state nor have minimum
contacts with the forum state would be rebuttably presumed to be beyond
the personal jurisdiction of federal bankruptcy forums located within that
state. This presumption could, however, be rebutted, and jurisdiction could
be asserted over a nonresident defendant if the plaintiff could establish that
no unfair burden would be imposed on the defendant by the exercise of
jurisdiction. 291 A resident of Covington, Kentucky, for example, would
probably suffer no unfair burden in being forced to defend in bankruptcy
court across the river in Cincinnati, Ohio, despite the Kentucky defendant's
lack of minimum contacts with Ohio. 29 That same Kentucky resident should,
on the other hand, not be forced to defend a suit brought in bankruptcy
court in California, absent minimum contacts with that distant state.
The 100 mile bulge provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(0293
is based on a similar presumption. Rule 4(f) subjects parties impleaded
pursuant to Rule 14294 or brought in as necessary parties pursuant to Rule
19295 to the jurisdiction of a federal district court if the party in question
is served within 100 miles of the courthouse, even if service is made outside
291. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,, 472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985); cf. Wasserman,
supra note 64, at 128 (suggesting total disregard of state sovereignty in actions brought in
state court).
292. Cf. GEX Kentucky, Inc. v. Wolf Creek Collieries Co. (In re GEX Kentucky, Inc.),
85 Bankr. 431 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (involving Chapter 11 debtor's action in bankruptcy
court in Cincinnati to determine ownership of real estate in Kentucky). The extent of the
burden on the defendant would be different if the action had been commenced, as it was in
GEX Kentucky, Inc., in the Northern District of Ohio.
293. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f) provides:
All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial
limits of the state in which the district court is held, and, when authorized by a
statute of the United States or by these rules, beyond the territorial limits of that
state. In addition, parties who are brought in as parties pursuant to Rule 14, or as
additional parties to a pending action or a counter-claim or cross-claim therein
pursuant to Rule 19, may be served in the manner stated in paragraphs (1)-(6) of
subdivision (d) of this rule at all places outside the state but within the United States
that are not more than 100 miles from the place in which the action is commenced,
or to which it is assigned or transferred for trial; and persons required to respond
to an order of commitment for civil contempt may be served at the same places. A
subpoena may be served within the territorial limits provided in Rule 45.
294. "Impleader" refers to a claim brought by the defendant against a third party who
may be liable to the defendant if the defendant is held liable to the plaintiff. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 14; Tate v. Frey, 735 F.2d 986, 988-89 (6th Cir. 1984). See generally 6 FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 51, § 1441.
295. Under Rule 19, a necessary party is a party who must be joined as a defendant in
a pending action, if such joinder is feasible. See FED. R. CIv. P. 19; West Coast Exploration
Co. v. McKay, 213 F.2d 582, 592-93 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 989 (1954); see
generally 7 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 51, § 1604.
1250
BANKRUPTCY SER VICE OF PROCESS
the state in which the court is located. 296 Under the analysis used in this
article, the 100 mile bulge rule could be said to be based on an irrebuttable
statutory presumption that parties served within 100 miles of the courthouse
will suffer no undue burden from having to answer in a court in such close
proximity to the place at which service was accomplished.
297
Under the set of presumptions proposed here, defendants who reside in
the state in which the district court sits would, of course, be subject to
service in the same manner as they would have been if the action had been
brought in state court. Further, nonresident defendants who have minimum
contacts with the forum state would be subject to personal jurisdiction in
a bankruptcy court located within that state, unless the defendant could
establish, as in Asahi,29 that it would offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction
over the defendant.
This suggested approach is analogous to existing Fourteenth Amendment
minimum contacts analysis, but is modified to account for the territorial
sovereignty of the federal government. Under the Fourteenth Amendment
a defendant who lacks minimum contacts with the forum state is beyond
the sovereign power of the forum state and beyond the reach of that state's
courts. The Fourteenth Amendment's traditional concern with the con-
straints inherent in a federalist system2  prevents a state from exercising
personal jurisdiction over a defendant who lacks minimum contacts with
the forum regardless of how convenient it might be for the defendant to
defend in the forum state. However, because federal courts exercise the
sovereign power of the United States, no similar limitation applies to cases
governed by the Fifth Amendment. A resident of the United States is subject
to the sovereign power of the United States government except to the extent,
in this context, that she is protected, under the Fifth Amendment, from
unfair governmental burdens. If the plaintiff can show that the defendant
is subject to the sovereign power of the United States, and that the proposed
assertion of personal jurisdiction would impose no unfair burden, the court
should be able to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant.
This approach has the further advantage of clarifying the respective
roles of state sovereignty and procedural fairness in cases dealing with both
federal and state sovereignty. In cases arising under both the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendments, sovereignty is necessary, but is not sufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction. In suits properly brought in federal bank-
296. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f). See also FED. R. Crv. P. 45(e) (applying similar 100 mile bulge
rule for service of subpoenas).
These bulge rules do not apply to original defendants, but only to those brought in as
third party defendants or as necessary parties.
297. See 4A FEERAL PRACTCE & PROCmuRE, supra note 51, §§ 1127-1128; but see
Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 6, at 1143.
298. Asahi Metal Indus., Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
299. FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 51, § 1067, at 293.
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ruptcy court °° any person located in the United States or having minimum
contacts with the United States is subject to the sovereign power of the
federal government.3 0 Personal jurisdiction should be asserted only, how-
ever, when to do so would not impose an unfair governmental burden on
the defendant.
302
Similarly, state courts have sovereign power over persons located in the
state or who have minimum contacts with the state. As in Asahi, though,
jurisdiction cannot be exercised when, despite the presence of minimum
contacts, the assertion of jurisdiction would impose an unfair governmental
burden on the defendant. This approach thus acknowledges the importance
of governmental sovereignty, but unlike most decisions dealing with nation-
wide service of process, does not confuse the concept of basic governmental
power with the fairness of the burden that might be imposed on an individual
defendant through the use of such power.
303
Procedural fairness to the defendant can be accomplished through a set
of presumptions which, as indicated above, seek first to determine whether
the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state. In most cases
in bankruptcy court the defendant's contacts with the debtor, which gave
rise to the dispute, will be sufficient to establish the defendant's contacts
with the forum in which the debtor's bankruptcy petition is pending.
Exceptions will occur only when the defendant has dealt with a branch or
affiliate of the debtor exclusively in the defendant's home state.
If the defendant has such contacts with the forum state, the bankruptcy
court will be able to assert jurisdiction unless the defendant establishes that
the burdens of defending in the forum state outweigh the government's
interest in having the litigation conducted in that forum. In most cases in
bankruptcy court the defendant's voluntary contacts with the debtor in the
forum state that gave rise to the claim asserted by the debtor will make it
difficult for the defendant to contest the fairness of being expected to
answer a lawsuit arising from those contacts.
In other cases in which the defendant lacks minimum contacts with the
state in which the bankruptcy case is pending, there should be a presumption
against the bankruptcy court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendant. These will be cases in which the defendant's contacts
with the debtor, which gave rise to the dispute, were beyond the boundaries
of the state in which the debtor's bankruptcy case is pending.
These circumstances will arise most commonly, as indicated above,
when the defendant has dealt with a branch or affiliate of the debtor which
has subsequently filed its bankruptcy case in the jurisdiction in which its
300. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 & 157 (1988); Ferriell, Core Proceedings in Bankruptcy Court,
56 UMKC L. REv. 47 (1987).
301. See, e.g., Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d
300, 314 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
302. See Max Daetwyler Corp. v. R. Meyer, 762 F.2d 290 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 980 (1985).
303. See Fullerton, supra note 6, at 18-20.
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chief executive office or parent corporation is located or if that debtor's
corporate parent has properly filed a petition in that distant forum. Those
sued by a New York corporation should be able to resist defending in
bankruptcy court in Oregon if they lack minimum contacts with Oregon
because of the unfair burden of suffering the procedural disadvantages of
litigating in a geographically distant court.
C. Personal Jurisdiction in Proceedings on Creditors' Claims and the
Effect of Discharge
As indicated earlier, proceedings to determine the allowability of cred-
itors' claims are commonly heard in the bankruptcy court in which the
debtor's case is pending.3°4 Similarly, the substantive effect of a bankruptcy
discharge, granted by the court in which the case is pending, is to invalidate
any dischargeable claim held against the debtor prior to its bankruptcy
proceeding.30 5 A bankruptcy court's determination of the allowability of a
creditor's claim, and the effect of the bankruptcy court's discharge order
on geographically distant creditors must be binding on those creditors in
order for the debtor's bankruptcy case to achieve its basic goal of providing
the debtor a fresh start.306 In most bankruptcy cases in which the debtor
has filed its petition in a location close to its principal place of business,
most creditors will be within the court's jurisdiction because of their contacts
with the debtor there. Personal jurisdiction is likely to be a problem only
in cases of subsidiary or other affiliate entities which have taken advantage
of the bankruptcy venue rules307 to file in the same district as its affiliate
located in another jurisdiction. As the foregoing analysis suggests, these
situations and the Fifth Amendment's concerns for fairness may place some
creditors beyond the scope of the forum court's jurisdiction.
In rare situations involving only loosely affiliated enterprises, this po-
tential problem could be resolved by transfering the debtor's entire bank-
ruptcy case to another district. 3s This solution, however, would be highly
impractical in cases involving closely connected corporate enterprises, as it
almost certainly would result a serious and costly duplication of adminis-
trative expenses.3 09 In this latter and far more common situation, an alter-
native solution must be devised.
The bankruptcy court's jurisiction over a creditor to determine the
allowability of that creditor's claim can be established through the creditor's
304. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
305. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (1988).
306. See, e.g., Lines v. Fredrick, 400 U.S. 18, 19 (1970); Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375,
379-80 (1966); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244-45 (1934).
307. See supra text accompanying notes 27-32.
308. See 28 U.S.C. § 1412 (1988).
309. See, e.g., Gulf States Exploration Co. v. Manville Forest Prod. Co. (In re Manville
Forest Prod. Corp.), 896 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1990); Glassel v. Allegheny Int'l Credit Corp.
(In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc.), 111 Bankr. 495 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990); Wyandotte Indus. v.
E.Y. Neill & Co. (In re First Hartford Corp.), 63 Bankr. 479 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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consent, given by filing a proof of claim in the first location. °10 The filing
of a proof of claim has long been treated as giving consent to a bankruptcy
court's subject matter jurisdiction, 3"I and, thus, no difficulty should arise
in treating such an action as conferring consent to the bankruptcy court's
personal jurisdiction over the filing creditor.
The effect of the debtor's bankruptcy discharge on creditors who are
beyond the scope of the court's personal jurisdictional power is a more
serious problem. Unless the debtor's discharge is binding upon those cred-
itors it will, under the analysis suggested by this article, have no binding
effect on them.
This difficulty could be resolved in a variety of ways. One solution
would be to issue notice of the bankruptcy proceeding through a bankruptcy
court in the district in which the creditors are located. Alternatively, notice
of the debtor's bankruptcy proceeding might be issued through a district in
which the debtor has its principal place of business, relying on the strong
likelihood that creditors will have sufficient contacts -with the debtor in that
location to warrant personal jurisdiction over them there. While such an
approach may, in an unusual case, require a proceeding on the debtor's
right to a discharge to be conducted distantly from the forum in which the
debtor's reorganization case is pending, it would be a simple solution to an
otherwise vexing problem.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has identified the ways in which the nationwide service of
process provision of Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d) combined with the liberal
venue provisions in bankruptcy cases can impose unfair and, in this author's
view, unconstitutional burdens on parties forced to litigate their disputes
with a bankrupt debtor in a distant and inconvenient forum. The consti-
tutional validity of these rules, although ratified by many inferior federal
courts, has not been addressed by the Supreme Court since before the
advent of the modern jurisprudence of personal jurisdiction in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's recent decisions
regarding personal jurisdiction under the minimum contacts standard of the
Fourteenth Amendment, particularly Insurance Corp. of Ireland, have em-
phasized the significance of ensuring that the defendant is not saddled with
the unanticipated and unfair burdens of litigating in a distant forum with
which the defendant has had no salient contact. These same decisions have
rejected territorial sovereignty, the only basis for the validity of Bankruptcy
Rule 7004(d), as a sufficient explanation for modern constitutional analysis
of questions of personal jurisdiction.
Unlike other nationwide service of process provisions, Rule 7004(d) is
accompanied by a liberal set of venue rules and restricted opportunities for
310. See 11 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1988).
311. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (1988); see Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966); Ferriell,
supra note 154, at 134-141.
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defendants to obtain a change of venue. 12 When considered together these
features provide a bankrupt plaintiff with a particularly convenient forum
in which to litigate disputes connected to its bankruptcy case. As this article
has shown, these rules are indeed designed for the convenience of the
bankrupt plaintiff, and, thus, show little regard for the inconveniences and
burdens that may be suffered by those who have had the misfortune to
have disputed dealings with the debtor.
In response to these concerns, this article proposes tempering the rule
permitting nationwide service of process with a simple set of presumptions
that would protect a defendant from being forced to litigate with a bankrupt
debtor in a distant and procedurally inconvenient forum. As with current
practice under the Fourteenth Amendment, defendants located in the forum
state would be subject to the personal jurisdiction of state and federal
courts in that state.
Nonresident defendants having minimum contacts with the bankruptcy
forum state normally would be subject to the jurisdiction of the forum
court. Consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Asahi, however,
nonresident defendants would be able to rebut the presumption in favor of
personal jurisdiction by showing that the assertion of jurisdiction would
impose on them an unfair burden.
Most importantly, and in sharp deviation from current doctrine, non-
resident defendants who lack minimum contacts with the bankruptcy forum
state, would, under the approach suggested here, be protected from having
to defend in that state absent a showing that the defendant would suffer
no undue burden by being forced to defend. In such cases there should be
a presumption against assertions of jurisdiction over defendants who lack
minimum contacts with the forum. That presumption could be rebutted,
however, by evidence that the defendant would suffer no unfair burden on
account of having to defend in what might be a geographically nearby, but
nevertheless distant, state.
The Supreme Court's adoption of this set of standards would gain the
principal advantage of protecting defendants from some of the otherwise
unfair burdens associated with having once dealt with a now bankrupt
debtor. It would have the additional advantage of clarifying that the
Supreme Court's minimum contacts decisions rest on the modern due process
principle of protecting defendants against unfair governmental burdens
rather than the outmoded and mostly otherwise rejected importance of
territorial sovereignty manifested by Pennoyer v. Neff. Finally, it would
ensure a strong degree of symmetry between the standards for personal
jurisdiction under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
312. See Hogue v. Milodon Engineering, Inc., 736 F.2d 989 (4th Cir. 1984); Driver v.
Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 156 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Stafford v. Briggs,
444 U.S. 527 (1980).
1991] 1255

